

Annual Report 2012

Review and Prospects of Internal and External Situations

January 2013

Public Security Intelligence Agency
JAPAN

Preface

Based on the Subversive Activities Prevention Act and the Act Regarding the Control of Organizations Which Committed Indiscriminate Mass Murder, the Public Security Intelligence Agency (公安調査庁, *Koanchosa-cho*) conducts control activities targeting such organizations and investigations for the purpose of implementing control measures, including surveillance of Aum Shinrikyo. Moreover, as a member of the intelligence community in Japan, the PSIA also collects and analyzes both domestic and foreign information, including data pertaining to international terrorism and the situation in North Korea.

This 2013 edition of the Review and Prospects of Internal and External Situations reviews developments in domestic and international public security in 2012 (as of the end of November), as well as looking at the future prospects in these areas. It is hoped that this report will be of assistance in understanding the domestic and international security situation.

In this report, unless otherwise noted, the months refer to the year 2012. In addition, the titles of individuals mentioned hereinafter are those at the time of writing.

The Review and Prospects of Internal and External Situations is also available on the PSIA website: <http://www.moj.go.jp/psia/>

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I. Overall Review of the Public Security Situation in 2012

1. International Situation

- (1) Following the death of General Secretary Kim Jong Il in December 2011, North Korea launched a new regime led by his third son, First Secretary Kim Jong Un. Demonstrating his stance of adhering to the “military first policy,” First Secretary Kim Jong Un put efforts into food production and the development of the capital city, while working on a policy study for the reform of economic management. In external affairs, North Korea pressed the launch of a missile purported to be a “satellite” in spite of the “2.29 Agreement” reached with the United States on nuclear and missile issues. In addition, North Korea repeatedly denounced “US’s hostile policies” against it and insisted on the strengthening of its “nuclear deterrent force.” In relations with South Korea, North Korea continued its hard-line stance toward the Lee Myung Bak administration while indicating the possibilities of military attack with an eye to the presidential election of South Korea in December. North Korea worked to expand economic ties with China and Russia by continuing the promotion of joint development of the special economic zones with China and obtaining Russia’s agreement to a large reduction of debt. It agreed with Japan to hold intergovernmental consultations for the first time in about four years to discuss the issue of Japanese remains left in North Korea and accepted groups of Japanese citizens visiting graves.
- (2) Strongly responding against the acquisition and retention of the Senkaku Islands by Japan’s government, China vociferously repeated criticism of Japan in the international community and dispatched its public vessels to the sea area, adopting a tougher stance than ever, including suspension of cultural exchange. In the South China Sea, too, China assumed a tough stance to secure marine interests and it repeated friction with contesting states. In China, social injustice, such as widening income disparities and bribery/corruption, erupted while there was a drop in the economic growth that had been the driving force of the country. Against this backdrop, the 18th Party Congress was held and the new leadership of Xi Jinping began. The new leadership is anticipated to work for the stability of social order through improvement of people’s lives and tighter management of public security.
- (3) In Russia, the newly inaugurated Putin administration pursued an internal policy combining appeasement of public opinion and control. On the diplomatic front, the country strengthened its relationship with Asia Pacific countries with focus on relations with China while keeping it in check. In terms of the relationship with Japan, while calling for economic cooperation, Russia went ahead with controlling Japan’s Northern Territories within its own borders.
- (4) The “Arab Spring,” which started in December 2010, had a huge impact on Middle Eastern and North African countries, and included regime change in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, and great confusion in Syria.

- (5) With regard to international terrorism, al-Qaeda is in decline but tried to ensure its influence in Arab countries. In addition, al-Qaeda-affiliated organizations continued terrorist activities while “lone-wolf home-grown terrorists” are posing new threats.
- (6) With regard to the proliferation issue, there was concern about the procurement activities by Iran and North Korea, which are continuing the development of WMDs. In Japan there were many cyber-attacks with the apparent aim of obtaining sensitive information held by the Japanese government and private companies.

2. Domestic Situation

- (1) The Public Security Examination Commission (PSEC) recognized that Asahara maintained almost absolute influence over the activities of Aum Shinrikyo and decided to extend the surveillance period (the 4th extension).

Based on its policy of “getting back to Asahara,” the mainstream group of Aum Shinrikyo provided thorough instruction to instill absolute faith in Asahara and tightened the control over its followers. The whole group deployed recruiting activities and gained a large number of new followers.

The Joyu group, on the other hand, continued the line to “hide the influence of Asahara” and used various media for propaganda of a stance of “breaking away from Asahara,” while at the same time implementing a ritual akin to the “initiation” that used to characterize the training under Asahara. In addition, the group conducted promulgation/propaganda activities using the Internet.

- (2) Radical leftist groups and the JCP sent their activists and party members to anti-nuclear meetings and demonstrations, and criticized the government. They also conducted campaigns against the deployment of the Osprey, the joining of Trans-Pacific Partnership (TTP) talks, etc.
- (3) Radical leftist groups worked to expand and strengthen their organization and intensified their approach to students and members of Japan Federation of National Service Employees and other labor unions of key industries. Some groups implemented rallies and demonstrations against the International Monetary Fund (IMF)-World Bank annual meeting.
- (4) The JCP tried to expand its influence and support for the party, focusing on the “big campaign to expand the party’s power” marking the 90th anniversary of the party’s foundation and conducting a “big campaign to advance in the general election” toward the snap general election.
- (5) Right-wing groups conducted protest activities taking up moves of neighboring countries concerning the Senkaku Islands, Takeshima and the Northern Territories and staged street campaigns criticizing the government’s policy and calling for the “defeat of the DPJ government.”

II. Focal Issues of the External Situation in 2012

1. North Korea and Chongryon (General Association of Korean Residents in Japan)


- (1) In North Korea, the Kim Jong Un regime began and strived to solidify its power base.
- Following the death of Kim Jong Il, Kim Jong Un inherited power, consolidated the new regime of the party, government and military, and emphasized the succession of the “military first policy” and the improvement of the living standards of the people.
 - While focusing on food production and the capital city development, North Korea explored possible reforms to vitalize the economy and continued expansion of economic relations with China and Russia.

A new regime began, with Kim Jong Un assuming the top posts of the party, government and military.

Following the death of General Secretary Kim Jong Il in December 2011 (North Korea announced that “he died of acute myocardial infarction on 17”), Kim Jong Un, his third son and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea, took up the supreme commander post in the name of “the last instructions” of General Secretary Kim Jong Il and tried to deify the General Secretary by permanently preserving his body and erecting a bronze statue of him (January) as well as conferring upon him the posthumous title of Grand Marshal (February), thus impressing his position as the successor of power. Kim Jong Un was also elected to First Secretary and Chairman of the Central Military Commission at the party’s 4th representative conference and First Chairman of the National Defense Commission at the 5th Session of the 12th Supreme People’s Assembly that followed (April), and established a new regime.

Kim Jong Un appointed Secretary Choe Ryong Hae, who was reported to have been close to General Secretary Kim Jong Il, to Director of the General Political Department to take the

leadership of the party organization in the military (April). He also pushed personnel reshuffles in succession including the posts of Minister of the People’s Armed Forces (Kim Yong Chun was replaced by Kim Jong Gak in April) and Chief of General Staff (RiYong Ho was replaced by Hyong



Yong Chol in July), indicating his struggle to control the military, which is the key to maintaining the regime.

Among the ruling circles, Director Choe Ryong Hae and Chang Song Taek, brother-in-law of Kim Jong Il and vice chairman of the National Defense Commission, frequently accompanied Kim Jong Un, while Kim Kyong Hui, Kim Jong Il's younger sister, Chang Song Taek's wife and a Political Bureau member and secretary of the Party, also appeared at important occasions, indicating their roles as advisers and guardians of Kim Jong Un.

North Korea stressed “the emphasis on people” while showing adherence to the “military first policy.”

First Secretary Kim Jong Un made a speech at the military parade on the 100th anniversary of Kim Il Sung's birth in April. In this speech, he demonstrated adherence to the existing line by stressing “the road of sovereignty, military first and socialism guarantees the final victory.” Furthermore, he demonstrated his stance of adhering to the “military first policy” by inspecting front-line forces one after another, for example, at the 52nd anniversary of Kim Jong Il's start of the “military first revolutionary leadership” in August. On the other hand, he also impressed the approach of focusing on economic issues by emphasizing “the improvement of the living standards of the people” in speeches, including the one in April before a representative conference of the party.

North Korea invited representatives of youth and aged generations from across the country to the events held in Pyongyang to commemorate the founding of “Korean Children's Union” (June), “War Victory Day (the day of concluding the cease-fire agreement of Korean War)” (July) and “Youth Day” (August), and gave them a magnificent welcome in an effort to garner mass support for the new regime. Furthermore, North Korean news agencies showed First Secretary Kim mingling with soldiers and residents to create an image of a friendly leader. The media also reported that Kim Jong Un reprimanded party leaders for their activity stance, and ran a campaign to demand that they dedicate themselves to the state and the people in an effort to enhance his authority.

Under anomalous weather, North Korea worked on food production in all-out mobilization while focusing on the development of Pyongyang.

In terms of economy, North Korea positioned a solution to the food problem as “an urgent challenge” in the “New Year's Joint Editorial” dated January 1 and worked on food production by mobilizing residents and soldiers to support villages. However, it seems that the efforts failed to eliminate the chronic food shortage due to a string of droughts (April to June) and flood damage caused by typhoons (July to September).

North Korea continued to promote a variety of construction work in the central part of Pyongyang and completed a large number of facilities, such as high-rise apartments, amusement parks and stores. It also repaired rivers and developed parks by mobilizing troops. These are efforts to improve the capital city as “a show window” to demonstrate the development of the country to

mark the 100th anniversary of President Kim Il Sung's birth as well as to help improve the people's living standard.

Against this background, North Korea worked on studies and policy establishment for the reform of economy management under the instruction of First Secretary Kim toward reordering the economy.

China-North Korea joint development in special economic zones progressed, and there were moves toward expansion of economic ties with Russia.

Economic relations with China continued to be strong with the trade amount between the two countries during the period from January to October rising by 6.3% compared with the previous year to 4.96 billion dollars. There was certain progress in the joint development of the special economic zones that started in June 2011 ("Rason Economic and Trade Zone" and "Hwanggumpyong-Wihwa Island Economic Zone") as their continued promotion was confirmed at the 3rd meeting of the China-North Korea joint guidance committee held in Beijing (August). The improvement of the roads connecting the Port of Rajin and the China-North Korea border was completed (October), and the construction of buildings for the management committees of the respective zones started (September in Hwanggumpyong and October in Rason). However, there may be conflicts in individual projects as indicated by the announcement from a Chinese company that North Korea unilaterally demanded the withdrawal of the company investing in North Korean mines (August).

With Russia, on the other hand, there were moves with an eye toward expansion of economic ties, such as the agreement in which Russia agreed to forgive about 90 percent of North Korea's 11 billion dollar debt (September).

North Korea focused on bringing results for further consolidation of the regime.

The new regime is believed to have been stably maintained up to now, but it is expected to focus on bringing visible results in addition to generational change in the leadership and strengthening of social regimentation in order to further strengthen its base. Toward economic revitalization, in particular, the regime likely will make a strong effort to invite foreign investment and earn foreign currency in a large scale while making an effort to create an outward environment necessary for their realization. On the other hand, attention should also be paid to the possibility that North Korea will take peculiar moves, including military provocation, with the aim to tighten the regime.

Column: “Economic Reform” of North Korea

- Immediately after the death of General Secretary Kim Jong Il, First Secretary Kim Jong Un instructed the development of a “new economic management system.” As a result, it was reported that measures such as (1) pay rise, (2) expansion of companies’ discretionary power, (3) rationing of agricultural products, and (4) transfer of economic interests from the party/military to the cabinet would be implemented. It was said that these measures would be implemented as early as October but their complete implementation is not yet confirmed.
- Looking at the reported content, the “new economic management system” is far from a fundamental reform of economy management and is based on the position to firmly maintain the socialist economy system, as was the case with “7.1 Economic Management Improvement Measures” in 2002 and “currency exchange (redenomination)” in 2009.

“7.1 Economic Management Improvement Measures” (2002)	“Currency Exchange (Redenomination)” (2009)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Adoption of current market prices/ pay rise - Expansion of the discretionary power of factories/companies - Setting up of “public markets” (outlawing of other markets) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Exchange of new currency with old currency (invalidating money exceeding a set limit) - Devaluation of currency (centesimal); price adjustment - Freeze of amount paid (pay rise in essence) - Market control (e.g. item restriction)

- (2) US-North Korea relationship remained static without progress in nuclear or missile issues.
- North Korea pressed forward with the launch of a missile purported to be a “satellite” and suggested scrapping the “2.29 Agreement” with the US.
 - It repeatedly denounced “hostile US policies” against the North and insisted on strengthening its “nuclear deterrence capability.”

Despite the agreement with the US, North Korea launched a missile saying that this was “the instruction of General Kim Jong Il.”

Having negotiated nuclear and other issues since 2011, North Korea and the US reached an agreement in February and both announced its content (“2.29 Agreement”). The Agreement includes a temporary halt to nuclear testing, long-range missile launches, and uranium enrichment activities by North Korea on one hand, and aid in the form of nutritious food by the US to North Korea on the other. After the agreement, negotiation started between the two countries for realization of the aid.

Against this background, North Korea gave notice that it would launch a missile purported to be “a working satellite” in April (March). Later, North Korea argued that the launch would not breach the terms of the “2.29 Agreement” because “launching a satellite is not included in long-range missile launches” and that the launch was “the instruction of General Kim Jong Il” and “had been planned for a long time.” In addition, North Korea insisted that the launch was not for military purposes by inviting journalists from Japan and Western countries before the launch, revealed “Kwangmyongsong (Bright Star)-3,” purported to be an “earth observation satellite,” and “Unha (Galaxy)-3” set at the launch site, and explained that the “satellite” would be used for “weather forecasting and resource exploration.”

On April 13 North Korea pressed forward with the launch of the missile as it had announced beforehand, but relevant countries confirmed that the missile fell soon after the launch. On the same day North Korea made an extraordinary report, “the earth observation satellite failed to reach orbit,” admitting failure.

Later, in response to the UN Security Council’s adopting of a chairman’s statement condemning the launch (April 16), North Korea issued a Foreign Ministry statement on the next day saying that the chairman’s statement was “led by the US,” “we are no longer bound by the ‘2.29 Agreement’” and “we will continue to launch various working satellites,” indicating it would scrap the agreement. Then in December North Korea announced that it would launch “a satellite” again.

North Korea declared itself “a nuclear nation” in its constitution and emphasized promotion of “nuclear deterrence capacity development.”

In April, North Korea amended its constitution and stipulated that it is “a nuclear nation” in the preamble. Since the missile launch, it declared that events such as South Korea-US joint military live-fire drills (June) and the agreement on the revision of South Korea-US Missile Guidelines (October) were signs of the “hostile US policies” against North Korea. Based on this declaration, North Korea stressed that it “will further develop its self-defensive nuclear deterrence capability as long as the hostile policies continue” and relentlessly showed a stance that a solution to the nuclear issue required a concession by the US. It was reported that officials of North Korea and the US repeated nonofficial contact after the missile launch in April but official talks were not resumed.

Attention continues to be paid to the nuclear/missile issues after the start of the new US administration.

The Obama administration of the US has clarified its position that in order to improve the North Korea-US relations North Korea should take concrete steps toward denuclearization. President Obama is expected to continue the policies after his re-election. Against this background, North Korea may choose harder-line measures including nuclear tests in addition to missile launches with the aim of bringing the US to negotiations while justifying the continuation of nuclear/missile development on the pretext of “hostile US policies.” North Korea’s moves continue to be of particular concern.

Column: North Korea sought closer relationships with Southeast Asia

- From May to August, North Korea dispatched senior party, government and military officials in succession including Kim Yong Nam, president of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly to Southeast Asian countries.

May	Laos	Ri Yong Ho, chief of General Staff
May	Singapore, Indonesia	Kim Yong Nam, president of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly
June	Laos, Vietnam, Myanmar	Kim Yong Il, KWP secretary
August	Vietnam, Laos	Kim Yong Nam, president of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly

- President of Laos Choummaly Sayasone visited North Korea in September 2011 and had talks with General Secretary Kim Jong Il and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission Kim Jong Un. In 2012 there were active exchanges first in recent years, with senior party, government and military officials of North Korea visiting Laos and concluding agreements concerning information technology.
- In August Vietnam indicated it would provide 5,000 tons of rice to North Korea, while Indonesia announced in September that it provided North Korea with food aid equivalent to two million dollars.
- In the background to the series of moves, North Korea may have the motive of diversifying its exchange partners and gaining actual economic benefits by activating the relationships with Southeast Asian countries as it becomes increasingly dependent on China.

- (3) North Korea continued its hard-line stance toward South Korea with an eye to the change from the Lee Myung Bak administration.
- North Korea conducted provocative acts against South Korea while slandering President Lee Myung Bak.
 - Watching the movements regarding the South Korean presidential election, North Korea continued to criticize the governing Saenuri Party.

North Korea continued to intensively denounce President Lee Myung Bak and maintained its adversarial stance.

Reacting sharply against the South Korean government's restriction of delegations to Kim Jong Il's funeral (December 2011), North Korea declared that "we will refuse forever to engage with traitor Lee Myung Bak and his group." North Korea maintained the stance in 2012, arguing that "there is no hope for North-South relationship as long as there is the Lee Myung Bak group of traitors." When it was reported in March that placards denouncing Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un were posted in the South Korean military, North Korea bolstered its confrontational stance against South Korea, repeatedly declaring that it will indiscriminately stage its own-style sacred war, and held rallies condemning South Korea nationwide starting from Pyongyang.

Later, in response to the launch of a missile purported to be a "satellite" by North Korea in April, South Korean civil groups protested by burning a photo of First Secretary Kim Jong Un, and President Lee Myung Bak mentioned the need for reform and opening under the regime of Kim Jong Un. North Korea condemned these actions as "defamation of the supreme dignity" and threatened South Korea by declaring, "The special actions of our revolutionary armed forces will start soon to meet the reckless challenge of the group of traitors." Further in mid-April, North Korea held rallies condemning the Lee Myung Bak administration following those conducted in March starting from "Pyongyang Army-Civil Rally." When South Korea announced that a GPS disturbance occurred in its capital region from April to May due to interference from North Korea, North Korea denied its involvement saying this was "trumped-up (by South Korea)."

North Korea rejected calls for dialogues and proposals of aid from South Korea, repeatedly suggesting a military attack on the South.

To the proposal of North-South Red-Cross negotiations for family reunions made by South Korea in August, North Korea rejected the proposal in effect by answering that South Korea should lift sanctions first and resume the Mt. Kumgang tourism project. Furthermore, in September, when South Korea offered food aid including 10,000 tons of flour to North Korea hit by flooding, North Korea rejected the aid, arguing that "South Korea insulted us by offering a negligible quantity of

goods.” On the other hand, North Korea accepted aid including flour from South Korean private organizations in the same month, thus showing again its stance of ignoring the Lee Myung Bak administration.

In September, North Korean fishing boats crossed the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the Yellow Sea in succession. Responding to the warning shots fired from the South Korean Navy, North Korea argued that “our revolutionary forces are ready to launch a powerful strike.” In October, opposing the plan to scatter propaganda leaflets by a North Korean defector group located in South Korea, North Korea warned of a prompt military strike in an “open warning letter” in the name of “The Western Front Command of the Korean People’s Army,” thus persistently indicating the possibility of a military attack on South Korea.

North Korea denounced Park Geun Hye of the ruling Saenuri Party with an eye to South Korean presidential election.

With the parliamentary election (April) and presidential election (December) in South Korea in mind, North Korea started to denounce the ruling Saenuri Party and Representative Park Geun Hye, a member of the party who was said to be a powerful presidential candidate. On the occasion of the parliamentary election, North Korea repeatedly argued that South Koreans should clear away the Lee Myung Bak and Park Geun Hye groups in the elections this year. After Park Geun Hye was nominated as the presidential candidate of the Saenuri Party in August, North Korea warned against her stance toward the North by arguing that because Park Geun Hye was following the course of traitor Lee Myung Bak, it was clear that “the North-South relations would never be pulled out of deadlock if such venomous element seizes power.”

North Korea will work to extract reconciliation policies from South Korea while seeing what the next administration will do first.

Waiting to see what the next South Korean administration to be launched in February 2013 will do, North Korea is expected to move toward a fresh start of the stalled North-South relationship in order to extract reconciliation policies from South Korea, such as a lifting of the sanctions against it and implementation of a variety of aid. In this process, it may activate its overt and covert approach to South Korea.

Column: Reaction of North Korea to President Lee Myung Bak's visit to Takeshima

- On August 10, President Lee Myung Bak of South Korea visited Takeshima, which is an integral part of Japan but has been controlled by South Korea since 1954. This was the first time a Korean President visited Takeshima. In response, the Japanese government strongly protested against the South Korean Government and proposed a joint suit with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for a settlement to the territorial dispute over Takeshima, but South Korea rejected the proposal.
- Concerning these moves by Japan and South Korea over Takeshima, North Korea pressed its standpoint that "Dokdo (Takeshima) is our people's sovereign territory" and criticized the Takeshima visit by President Lee Myung-Bak as "a cheap political drama to obscure his true nature of pro-Japanese traitor," while condemning the moves of the Japanese government toward filing a suit with ICJ as "a scheme to steal Dokdo."

(4) North Korea showed a positive attitude toward “the issue of remains” and agreed to hold intergovernmental consultations with Japan for the first time in four years.

- North Korea announced a dialogue on the return of Japanese remains and showed burial sites to groups of Japanese citizens who used to live in the North, as well as Japanese media.

-While sticking with the prior contention that the abduction issue was “resolved,” North Korea mentioned that the improvement of Japan-North Korea relations was “the instruction” of General Secretary Kim Jong Il.

Taking up the issue of Japanese remains, North Korea focused on creating an environment to resume dialogue with Japan.

North Korea had not had any official talks with Japan since the Japan-North Korea working-level talks held on the issue of abducted Japanese in August 2008. Since spring in 2012, however, North Korea repeatedly raised the issue of Japanese remains left in North Korea after the Second World War as a “humanitarian issue” and worked to create an environment to resume dialogue with Japan. Specifically, Song Il Ho, ambassador for North Korea-Japan talks, expressed the intention to return the remains to Japan in a talk with Japanese visitors to North Korea (April), which was followed by Hwang Ho Nam, Director of Korean Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, who asked visiting Japanese local assembly members for Japan’s declaration of intention toward the return of remains (May). In addition, North Korea invited the Japanese media (June) to visit burial sites of the remains, and allowed Japanese citizens who used to live in North Korea during and after the Second World War, including members of the “Zenkoku Seishinkai,” to visit graves (August to December). It also allowed a visiting Japanese Diet member to tour the burial sites (October).

Against this background, Japanese and North Korean athletes visited each other’s country following 2011. For the 2012 FIFA U-20 Women’s World Cup Japan (August to September) the Japanese government decided that the North Korean national team were in “exceptional circumstances” and gave them special permission to enter Japan. In November, Japanese university students visited North Korea for friendly matches.

North Korea repeatedly called for “reparations for the past” while referring to “improving relations with Japan.”

After the death of General Secretary Kim Jong Il, North Korea maintained its basic stance of regarding the abduction issue as “settled” by insisting “it no longer exists or smells” (January), “everything is already solved and weathered” (May) and “it was completely settled due to our sincere efforts” (July).

Further on September 17, the 10th anniversary of signing Japan–North Korea Pyongyang Declaration, North Korea announced through *Korean Central News Agency* a comment repeating the assertion that the abduction issue was “already settled.” Regarding the improvement of relations with Japan, on the other hand, the comment stressed its importance by indicating, “It is the behest of Grand Marshal Kim Jong Il to improve the DPRK-Japan relations so that the two countries may become near and close countries, rather than near yet distant ones,” and, “The government of the DPRK remains unchanged in its stand to implement the DPRK-Japan Pyongyang Declaration to the last.” At the same time it argued, “Whether the DPRK-Japan relations are normalized in conformity with the expectation of the international community and the wishes of the peoples of the two countries in the new century or remain in the abnormal state of confrontation entirely depends on Japan’s attitude.” From then on, North Korea repeatedly asked Japan for “reparations for the past” through statements such as “reparations for the past are an historical task for Japan and a national obligation that it cannot evade” and “there would be no DPRK-Japan relations without reparations for the past.”

North Korea agreed to hold intergovernmental consultations for the first time in four years for exchanging opinions on pending problems including the abduction issue.

While North Korea was repeating the same argument, North Korean and Japanese Red Cross Societies exchanged their opinions on the “issue of the remains” (August) and agreed that they would continue talks and ask Japanese and North Korean governments for cooperation toward the returning of remains and grave visiting.

In response, North Korea agreed to hold Japan-North Korea intergovernmental consultations (preliminary director-level talk in August and a main director-general level talk in November) for the first time in about four years since August 2008. After the preliminary talk, North Korea stated, in response to Japan’s stance to include the abduction issue on the agenda, that the agenda was “the issue of remains” and “if Japan keeps seeking an ulterior political purpose, it will adversely affect the DPRK-Japan intergovernmental consultations,” but in the main director-general level talk, North Korea exchanged opinions on the abduction issue and showed an attitude to continue talks. However, in response to North Korea’s notice of launching a missile purported to be a “satellite” in December, Japan decided to postpone the intergovernmental consultations scheduled in the same month.

North Korea responded flexibly to “humanitarian issues” in an effort to improve public opinion for North Korea.

North Korea is believed to have an intention to normalize diplomatic relations with Japan after improving Japan’s public opinion regarding North Korea by accepting Japanese citizens’ visiting graves in North Korea, showing an attitude to continue intergovernmental consultations on “the issue of remains” and flexibly responding to other “humanitarian issues,” such as Japanese wives’

temporary coming back to Japan, after making the Japanese government effectively shelve the abduction issue.

To this purpose, North Korea likely will make more approaches to every level in Japan by using “humanitarian issues” including the issue of the remains.

(5) With a view to a “new heyday,” Chongryon addressed strengthening its organization and ideology.

- Chongryon upheld Kim Jong Un as “excellent leader” and promoted learning and propagandizing “his greatness.”
- Chongryon focused on “competition among local branches” and “patriotic model movement” to strengthen its basis under the new chairman, Ho Jong Man

Chongryon promoted loyalty to First Secretary Kim Jong Un as top priority.

After the death of General Secretary Kim Jong Il in December 2011, praising First Secretary Kim Jong Un, who became the supreme leader of North Korea, as “excellent leader” and “unparalleled military-first General,” Chongryon conducted activities to teach and propagandize “the greatness” of Kim Jong Un in an effort to instill loyalty in activists and members.

Specifically, when talks and speeches (“elaboration”) by Kim Jong Un were published one after another in North Korea from April, the central Chongryon instructed its local organizations to learn every word of them. When North Korea sent a congratulatory telegram in the name of First Secretary Kim for the “congress for Chongryon’s branch activists to build a springboard for opening up a new heyday” (congress for branch activists) held in July, Chongryon positioned the telegram as a “platform guideline” and instructed full-time activists to study it. Chongryon also instructed non-full-time activists to watch videos and recite articles of its organ paper *Choson Shinbo* introducing on-spot guidance by Kim Jong Un.

With these instructions, local organizations held study sessions for full-time activists to learn “elaborations” and held activist meetings in various locations to study and teach Kim Jong Un’s ideas and meaning in the congratulatory telegram.

Chongryon stepped up its activities toward reconstruction/revitalization of branches/subunits.

Chongryon had been working on the reconstruction/revitalization of the base organization, including branches and subunits, with the goal of building a springboard for opening up a new heyday for North Korean Residents’ activities in Japan in 2012, which marks the 100th anniversary of the birth of President Kim Il Sung. With the death of General Secretary Kim Jong Il, Chongryon held the strengthening of its base organization as his instruction and instructed its activists to step up their efforts.

Specifically, Chongryon proposed “branch competition to build a springboard for a new heyday of Chongryon” in March with the aim of revitalizing its branches toward the first memorial of the death of General Secretary Kim in December. Since then, Chongryon encouraged its local

organizations to strive toward the achievement of ten “competition goals” including normalization of branches’ standing committees and 80% revitalization of their subunits.

In July, Chongryon proposed a “national patriotic model movement for a new heyday” (patriotic model movement) with the aim of reconstruction and revitalization of subunits, and announced that it would spread the movement up to 2015 in line with 10 goals, including a monthly meeting of the subunit committee and workshop, and encouragement of members to visit North Korea.

In addition, in order to boost the movement under Chairman Ho Jong Man, who took office in May, Chongryon held a “congress for branch activists” in July and the “2012 congress for Chongryon’s subunit representatives” in October to inspire activists, while sending leaders from the headquarters to local organizations to boost the efforts through direct guidance and encouragement to local headquarters, branches, and subunits.

Chongryon boosted its efforts toward application of “tuition-free program for public high schools.”

Chongryon had been conducting activities aimed at the application of the “tuition-free program for public high schools” by the Japanese Government to students of Korean schools. From February to March, meetings and signature-collecting campaigns on the streets were carried out intensively to call for the application of the program by bringing Japanese supporters to the fore. Chongryon also set up a “three-month intensive campaign” from July to September, mobilizing mainly teachers, guardians and students of Korean schools to propaganda activities on the streets. It also requested the Japanese government and political players for the early application of the program.

In response to the decisions by Osaka Prefecture and Osaka City not to give grants to Korean schools (March), Osaka Korean Schools filed a suit to seek resumption of subsidization at Osaka District Court against the two local governments on September 20 and held a press conference to plead that the decisions were “unfair.”

With the start of Korea Central Hall auction procedure, Chongryon sought to continue its use behind the scenes.

The Resolution and Collection Corporation (RCC), which was collecting debts of the headquarters of Chongryon, filed a suit for confirmation, etc. of possession of land and buildings toward an auction of Korea Central Hall. As the ruling in favor of RCC became final in the appeal hearing on June 27, RCC filed for auction procedure on July 10 and Tokyo District Court ruled for the start of the auction on the 12th of the same month.

In response, Chongryon worked to secure sponsors and funds in preparation for a possible auction with a set period, while at the same time seeking reconciliation with RCC for continued use of Korea Central Hall, hoping for a political resolution through development of Japan-North Korea talks. Within the organization, on the other hand, Chongryon tried to tighten its grip on activists and members by explaining that this is “political oppression by the Japanese authorities” to point an

accusing finger at the Japanese government.

Chongryon is believed to continue strengthening ideology and organization toward the 23rd congress.

Chongryon will likely continue education and propaganda of “the greatness” of First Secretary Kim Jong Un and the strengthening of its base organization toward development of a “new heyday.” The 23rd congress, which is Chongryon’s top decision-making body held once every three years, is scheduled for 2013, and it will be the first one since Ho Jong Man assumed the Chairman’s post, so Chongryon will further reinforce its efforts to call attention of North Korea to the “achievements.” As the issues of “tuition-free program for public high schools” and Korea Central Hall will have a great impact on the future of its organization, it is believed that Chongryon will continue to make approaches to every level of society while carefully evaluating the development of the Japanese political situation.

Column: Chairman of Chongryon

- Chongryon had a leadership style by a “chair group” consisting of multiple chairpersons since its formation in May 1955 to October 1957. After adopting the Senior Chair system, it made the shift to the current Chair-Vice-Chair system at the 4th congress held in May 1958.
- Han Deok Su who had served as chair since the formation became the first chair and remained in the office until February 2001, when he died at the age of 94. Next, the first vice-chairman, So Man Sul, succeeded the post from May 2001 to February 2012, when he died at the age of 84.
- After the death of So Man Sul, Chongryon kept the post of chairman vacant for a while but, stating that Kim Jong Un gave guidance, called an extended meeting of the 3rd session of the Central Committee in May and elected Chief Vice-Chairman Ho Jong Man to the third Chairman.
- Though it is reported that some activists and members dislike his flattery of North Korea and dictatorial dogmatism, no reactive action toward his accession to the office of Chairman surfaced because Ho Jong Man had been effectively acting for So Man Sul, who had been recuperating at home since around 2008.

2. China

- (1) Reacting strongly to the issue concerning the Senkaku Islands as a “territorial dispute” and referring to “core interests,” China took a more clearly hard-line stance against Japan.
- China stressed the existence of a “territorial dispute” by normalizing the dispatch of its government vessels against acquisition and retention of the Senkaku Islands by the Japanese government.
 - China is poised for a contest of endurance by taking countermeasures such as the cancellation of the event to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the diplomatic normalization, and stricter customs regulations.

Reacting strongly to the naming of unnamed islands, China indicated that the Senkaku Islands were part of its “core interests.”

Since the beginning of 2012, China showed strong reactions to Japan’s moves concerning the Senkaku Islands. Just after Japan’s announcement that it would name its unnamed islands (January), *People’s Daily* ran a comment stating “this is an action that openly undermines the core interests of China,” clearly calling the Senkaku Islands part of its “core interests” for the first time. In March, China announced its own version of the names of the islands after the Japanese government named them, and dispatched two “China Marine Surveillance (CMS) patrol boats” belonging to the State Oceanic Administration to the waters around the Senkaku Islands for the first time in three years and three months.

This Chinese stance became even clearer after Tokyo Governor Ishihara’s announcement of his intention to purchase the Senkaku Islands (April), and China indicated strong dissatisfaction with the moves by Japan. For example, a Chinese dignitary suggested that the Senkaku Islands were part of the “core interests” of China in a talk with a Japanese political player, and in May, Premier Wen Jiabao stressed the importance of respecting “China’s core interests and matters that are of great interest to China,” referring to the “Diaoyu Island issue,” at the summit talk with Prime Minister Noda, who visited China to attend the Japan-China-South Korea trilateral summit meeting.

Further, in July, when Prime Minister Noda announced a possible purchase of the Senkaku Islands, China showed a sensitive reaction through a comment by a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson stating that “no one will ever be permitted to buy or sell China’s sacred territory” on the same day and through a dispatch of four “fisheries administration vessels” of the Ministry of Agriculture to the waters around the Senkaku Islands.

Anti-Japan demonstrations protesting the arrest of activists who claim sovereignty took place all over China one day after another.

When Japanese police arrested 14 activists of “Hong Kong Action Committee for Defending the Diaoyu Islands,” a group of activists claiming sovereignty (August 15), who landed on Uotsuri Island of the Senkaku Islands, China summoned Ambassador of Japan to China Niwa and demanded their unconditional release. Though the activists were released after two days, the arrest triggered anti-Japan demonstrations all over China from August 15th to 26th, and Japanese restaurants and other businesses were attacked in some cities. In addition, a national flag of Japan’s public vehicle driving with Ambassador Niwa in Beijing was taken away by some Chinese nationals on the 27th.

China put pressure on Japan through its leaders’ “hard-line” statements and dispatch of official vessels.

Against this background, President Hu Jintao stated that China firmly opposes “the purchase of the islands” to Prime Minister Noda on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting (September 9). Just after Japan’s decision to purchase the Senkaku Islands at a meeting of relevant cabinet members (September 10), Premier Wen Jiabao said, “When it comes to sovereignty and territorial issues, the Chinese government and its people will never cave in.” Furthermore, the Chinese government strongly called for the repeal of ownership of the Senkaku Islands by the Japanese government through publishing “territorial border lines” of the Senkaku Islands and issuing a protesting statement.

Since the Japanese government purchased the Senkaku Islands on September 11, China has dispatched a total of 350 CMS patrol boats and fisheries administration vessels (as of November 30) to the waters around the Senkaku Islands. The vessels remained in the surrounding waters for an extended period, demonstrated by entering Japanese territorial waters and repeatedly entering the contiguous zone. Fisheries administration vessels also conducted on-board inspections on Chinese fishing boats that were operating in the waters to demonstrate that these were “law enforcement activities in their jurisdiction.” In October, the Chinese navy together with the State Oceanic Administration and the Fishing Bureau of the Ministry of Agriculture conducted a joint exercise in the East China Sea to put further pressure on Japan.

China increased its activities to appeal to the international community for the existence of “a territorial dispute” and the validity of its claim. It included submission of the “territorial base point, coordinate chart of the base line and the nautical chart of the Diaoyu Islands and attached islands” to the UN Secretary General, deciding to apply for an extension of its continental shelf to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, and Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi’s criticism against Japan by name at a UN General Assembly saying, “They can in no way change the historical fact that Japan stole Chinese territory” (September).

The largest anti-Japan rallies took place since the normalization of diplomatic relations inflicting immense damage on Japanese companies.

Since the acquisition and retention of the Senkaku Islands by the Japanese government, anti-Japan rallies took place all over China, including Beijing and Shanghai. Especially on the first weekend after the acquisition and retention (September 15), the largest anti-Japan rallies since the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China in 1972 took place, gathering several hundreds to tens of thousands of demonstrators in over 50 cities, including Beijing and Chongqing. In Shandong and Hunan, for example, demonstrators who turned violent broke into, vandalized and uprooted Japanese-affiliated departments and supermarkets. Again on the next day, anti-Japan rallies took place in over 100 cities, including Beijing and Guangzhou, where rioters stormed a hotel housing the Consulate-General of Japan in Guangzhou. In response to these rallies, *People's Daily* called for rational protest activities by running a comment titled "Use Civilization and Rule of Law to Gather the Force of Patriotism" on the 17th. However, on the 18th, the 81st anniversary of the Lake Liutiao Incident, anti-Japan rallies took place in over 125 cities, which caused damage including broken windows in the Japanese Embassy in Beijing and the Consulate-General in Shenyang.

Economic/cultural exchanges were suspended and events commemorating the 40th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations were "postponed."

Since just after the acquisition and retention of the Senkaku Islands by the Japanese government, China showed a hard-line stance against Japan by unilaterally cancelling exchanges in a wide range of fields including cultural, academic and economic fields. For example, China cancelled "2012 Conference of Young Writers in Japan and China," ordered the halting of sales of Japan-related books, tightened customs regulations, and canceled Chinese nationals' tours to Japan.

China also decided at the last minute to "postpone" the ceremony scheduled for September 27 to commemorate the 40th year of the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China, and instead, Jia Qinglin, fourth-ranking member of the Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Politburo and Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, met the representatives of seven Japan-China friendship organizations that visited Beijing.

Maintaining its hard-line stance against Japan, China is poised for a contest of endurance.

In spite of the impact on the 40th anniversary of normalization of diplomatic relations, China showed an even harder-line stance regarding the issue over the Senkaku Islands compared with that to "differences in the view of history." China repeatedly announced that "China urges Japan to stop all actions that undermine China's territorial sovereignty. Otherwise, all consequences should be borne only by the Japanese side" (Foreign Ministry statement on September 10). The reason to take this unyielding hard-line stance against Japan may be that it is difficult for China to take a

softer-line stance considering that, in addition to its domestic circumstances, such as the launch of Xi Jinping's leadership, any concession in the Senkaku Islands issue could have an impact on the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. It is believed that China, in addition to dispatching official vessels and promoting its claim of "sovereignty" to the international community, will continue measures of "wa jie zhan" (warfare to ruin an enemy without fighting), tenaciously repeating pressure on Japan's financial sector for a contest of endurance in order to force concessions from Japan.

Column: China is waging “wa jie zhan” in territorial disputes.


Since ancient times, Chinese people have valued strategies to win without fighting, as Sun Tzu noted in his *Art of War*: “to subjugate the enemy’s army without doing battle is the highest of excellence.”

In December 2003, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) added to its Regulations Regarding Political Affairs “three warfares” consisting of “public-opinion warfare,” “psychological warfare,” and “legal warfare” as “wa jie zhan” to undermine the opponent without using military means. According to *Xinhua* net on March 5, 2005, “public-opinion warfare” is “activities to form public opinion in one’s own favor using mass media, such as television, newspaper, radio and the Internet”; “psychological warfare” is “activities to use information to sap an opponent’s will to fight and weaken the opponent’s operational capabilities, while strengthening psychological defense on one’s own side”; and “legal warfare” is “legally advantageous activities using domestic and international laws to reveal illegal activities of the opponent and gain support of the international community.” These three are expected to increase effectiveness in coordination with each other.

The PLA Academy of International Relations started to study warfare with cajolement in the information age around 2003 and published *wa jie zhan* as a result in January 2010. In the book, “wa jie zhan” is defined as “countermeasures to make the opponent succumb and collapse by implementing flexible and soft operations including penetration, influence, conversion and sabotage in comprehensive operation of political, economic, cultural, psychological, deterrent, conspiracy, public opinion, legal, informational and other bloodless means.”

In light of the response of China to the Japanese government’s acquisition and retention of the Senkaku Islands and the conflict with the Philippines over the Scarborough Shoal, China seems to be implementing the “three warfares” and countermeasures to wage “wa jie zhan” one after another. It seems that China is planning to expand its influence in the international community and tear the public opinion of the target country by using “wa jie zhan” for what they claim as “territorial disputes,” which are diplomatic issues.

<Key measures taken by China over the Senkaku Islands and the Scarborough Shoal in 2012>



(2) In spite of its active diplomacy, conflicts with surrounding countries over marine interests escalated.

- China actively engaged in diplomacy with its neighbors through high-level exchange and economic cooperation.
- China confronted the Philippines in the Scarborough Shoal and showed strong wariness against the Asia-Pacific strategy of the United States.

Advocating “peaceful development,” China engaged in omnidirectional diplomacy to create a favorable international environment.

In the government work report by Premier Wen Jiabao at the National People’s Congress (March) China announced a policy to “promote peaceful development and firmly maintain autonomous peace-oriented diplomacy,” and actively engaged in omnidirectional diplomacy to create an external environment necessary for economic development, including securement of resources, as well as to expand its influence.

With its surrounding countries, in particular, China engaged in high-level exchange of party/government officials, including Politburo Standing Committee Members, in an aggressive effort to build and strengthen relationships including the expansion of economic/trade cooperation through infrastructure construction. For example, President Hu Jintao visited South Korea, India and Cambodia between March and April, Jia Qinglin, chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, visited Malaysia, Brunei and Thailand in April, and Wu Bangguo, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, visited Myanmar and Sri Lanka in September. Among these visits, Hu Jintao announced support for Cambodia in playing an important role as chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and an offer of economic assistance in succession, which indicate China’s approaches aiming at creating a diplomatic environment favorable to itself (March).

In its relationship with North Korea, while condemning the launch of the “satellite,” China trumpeted continuation and strengthening of the friendly relations by stating, “Friendly and cooperative China-North Korean relations is an unalterable direction” (Hu Jintao, in April), and also by stressing steady promotion of the joint development of Rason and Hwanggumpyong-Wihwa Island when Chang Song Taek, vice chairman of North Korea’s National Defense Commission, visited China in August. This move seems intended to prevent instability in China’s surrounding area by indirectly supporting the maintenance and stability of the regime of First Secretary Kim Jong Un.

Working to secure marine interests, China demonstrated stubbornness in its responses to contesting states.

While demonstrating a cooperative attitude, stating that “relevant countries reached important consensus on seeking peaceful settlement and pushing forward mutual cooperation” concerning the South China Sea problem (Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, March), China further reinforced its efforts to secure marine interests in various fields under the policy to “formulate and implement a strategy for marine development, and promote the development of the marine economy”(Premier Wen Jiabao, March) by increasing construction and deployment of new patrol boats and other vessels, patrol by maritime law enforcement agencies and start of oil drilling in the South China Sea.

Against this background, China experienced conflicts with relevant countries over the territorial rights in the South China Sea. In April, a Philippine ship stopped Chinese fishing boats from entering the area surrounding the Scarborough Shoal, which developed into several months of confrontation of ships of the two countries. During this period, tensions between the two countries increased as China demonstrated a hard-line stance taking measures such as strengthening of quarantine of fruits imported from the Philippines. Also, on June 21, when Vietnam adopted its “Law on the Sea,” which placed the Spratly and Paracel Islands under Hanoi’s sovereignty, China’s State Council approved the establishment of “Sansha City,” which covers the islands on the same day, and two days later, China National Offshore Oil Corporation announced invitation for bids for oil/natural gas mining in the sea near Vietnam. In this way China strongly defended its claims of sovereignty.

China promoted “new relations between major powers” to the US, which was strengthening its engagement in the region.

With increasing wariness against China due to its hard-line stance, the US took a stance to further strengthen its engagement in the Asia-Pacific region through expanding navy deployment, for example, under the policy of “Rebalancing.” In response, while announcing it “will watch carefully,” China repeatedly called for cooperation between “major powers with different political systems and development stages” based on the respect of each other’s national interests upon the opportunities of then Vice President Xi Jinping’s visit to the US (February) and other dignitary visits.

On the other hand, China’s vigorous efforts to strengthen relations with major regional powers and surrounding countries, which include the joint navy exercise with Russia in April, agreement to resume joint military training with India in September, and a string of visits to Myanmar by dignitaries and high-ranked officials, show its strong wariness of the US’ forming “a coalition against China.”

China will continue efforts to ensure marine interests and approaches to surrounding countries simultaneously.

It is believed that China will continue to work to expand its influence in the international community based on its growing national power. Especially in the Asia-Pacific Region, the new leadership of Xi Jinping will likely continue the focus on securing marine interests under the policy to “resolutely safeguard China’s maritime rights and interests and build China into a maritime power” (the 18th Party Congress Work Report in November), while at the same time trying to build cooperative relations with the US, in fear of rivalry with the country, calling for respect for China’s interests. China will also intensify interweaved soft and hard diplomatic activities toward ASEAN countries to take the lead in multilateral negotiations.

Column: China's main activities for control of disputed islands in the South China Sea

Since around 1950 China has been working to control islands in the South China Sea through the dispatching of official vessels, construction of buildings, and use of force. In 2012, official vessels of China and the Philippines confronted at the Scarborough Shoal. The future moves of China need to be closely watched because similar events could take place also in the East China Sea due to China's advance.

<Main advances (*including claims by China)>

[Advance to the Paracel Islands (against Vietnam)]

- Since around 1955: dispatched fishermen for high-seas fishing
- 1956: Guangdong province dispatched a marine resource survey team.
- 1971: China started construction of wharves and piers on Woody Island.
- 1973: Paris Accord was signed and US forces withdrew from South Vietnam.
- 1974: In January China invaded Crescent Group on which South Vietnamese troops were stationed and seized the Group after an armed clash.
- In recent years, China developed military facilities on Woody Island and established "Sansha" people's government on the island in June 2012.

[Advance to the Spratly Islands]

- o Fiery Cross Reef (against Vietnam)
 - 1987: Chinese Academy of Sciences and others dispatched survey ships and started to set up a marine observatory.
 - 1988: In March, an armed clash took place between Chinese South Sea Fleet and Vietnamese vessels. China captured the reef and five other reefs.
 - In recent years China has intensified patrolling by its official vessels.
- o Mischief Reef (against the Philippines)
 - 1987-1988: China dispatched survey units to the reef and Half Moon Shoal (Banyue Jiao) and set up signs.
 - 1991-1992: US forces withdrew from Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base in the Philippines
 - 1994: China started construction of weather-tight facilities for fishing boats
 - In recent years China has expanded facilities' equipment and intensified patrolling by its official vessels.

[Advance to Macclesfield Bank]

- o Scarborough Shoal (against the Philippines)
 - 1977-2007: Chinese Academy of Sciences conducted surveys intermittently
 - Since the 1990s there have been incidences of setting up signs, etc. by China and their removal by the Philippines.
 - 2012: In April, boarding of Chinese fishing boats by the Philippines developed into confrontation between Philippine vessels and Chinese fisheries administration/patrol boats and maritime surveillance boats. Since then, China has been dispatching its vessels to the surrounding sea area.

<Development of disputes (since April 2012)>

	Actions on the Chinese side	Actions on the Philippine side
April 10	Dispatched Haijian 84 and Haijian 75	A navy ship stopped 12 Chinese fishing boats
April 12	Dispatched Yu Zheng 303	The navy ship was replaced by a coast guard ship.
May 9	Tightened quarantine of fruits imported from the Philippines	
May 11	Called for postponement of trips to the Philippines	Anti-China demonstrations in Manila
May 16	Period of suspension of fishing started	Period of suspension of fishing started
June 1	Formally started marine observation /forecast of islands and sea area including the shoal	
June 3		Philippine official vessels left the cove of the shoal
June 5	Chinese official vessels left the cove of the shoal	
July 2	Foreign Ministry announced China "has reduced government ships in the waters as tensions eased."	
July 16		Period of suspension of fishing ended
August 1	Period of suspension of fishing ended	

- (3) Xi Jinping leadership came into office and advocated a “focus on public opinion” at the 18th Party Congress, being concerned about the loss of unifying force of the Party.
- Politburo standing committee was reduced to seven members, aiming at strengthening the collective leadership.
 - China struggled to cope with erupting social problems and to stabilize society through improvement of people’s living and public security control.

A new leadership was inaugurated with Xi Jinping as General Secretary of the Party.

The Communist Party of China (CPC) held the 18th Party Congress from November 8 to 14 and elected 205 new members of its Central Committee. Then on November 15, the First Plenary Session of the Central Committee chose Vice President Xi Jinping as the new General Secretary. The Politburo Standing Committee of the Party, the supreme leadership of the party, was reduced from nine members of the 17th committee to seven, five of which are promoted from Politburo members excluding Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang.

There is speculation that the selection was influenced by the intention of former General Secretary Jiang Zemin. Looking at their backgrounds, however, we can see that candidates with a stronger career in the Central Committee and richer leadership experience in provinces were chosen. It seems that the committee was reduced to seven to ensure rapid policy decision on a mountain of issues at home and abroad and to strengthen the collective leadership.

Members of Politburo Standing Committee of the Communist Party of China	
[The 17 th]	[The 18 th]
Hu Jintao (70)	Xi Jinping (59)
Wu Bangguo (71)	Li Keqiang (57)
Wen Jiabao (70)	Zhang Dejiang (66)
Jia Qinglin (72)	Yu Zhengsheng (67)
Li Changchun (68)	Liu Yunshan (65)
Xi Jinping (59)	Wang Qishan (64)
Li Keqiang (57)	Zhang Gaoli (66)
He Guoqiang (69)	(New members in red)
Zhou Yongkang (70)	(Age as of the end of 2012)

Before the congress, the Central Committee dismissed Chongqing Communist Party Secretary (Politburo member) Bo Xilai, who had been regarded as a candidate for membership in the Politburo Standing Committee from his party post, “on suspicion of serious violations of discipline” (April), and later expelled him from the party (September) and cancelled his qualification as representative to the National People’s Congress (October). In the process of the series of moves, the party stressed that this was “the correct decision of the CPC Central Committee” and repeatedly published comments calling for “a high level of ideological unity with the CPC Central Committee” in its organ paper *People’s Daily* in an effort to control commotion and confusion in the party and strengthen the solidarity.

Hu Jintao left the office of Chairman of the Central Military Commission but retained his influence.

After the Congress, not following the example of the late Deng Xiaoping and former General Secretary Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao left the office of Chairman of the Central Military Commission at the same time as he left the office of General Secretary. New General Secretary Xi, who assumed the post, praised Hu Jintao as having “sterling integrity” for this (November 15).

On the other hand, Hu Jintao arranged for the personnel change of the Central Military Commission that normally takes place after the Congress to be done earlier, before the Congress, most probably in order to reflect his intention in it. Hu Jintao also retained room for his influence on the party/military in various aspects; for example, in the constitutional revision at the Party Congress, the “scientific development concept” advocated by Hu Jintao was elevated to the status of a “guiding principle” of the party and state, an equal footing with previous leaders; and former members of the Communist Youth League to which Hu Jintao himself belonged accounted for about half of the Politburo members.

Stressing loyalty to the party and quality improvement by “maintaining the purity of the party.”

The 18th Party Congress Work Report stressed that building a party “respecting public opinion” is the first priority in future management of the party and country, stating, “We must always make realizing, safeguarding and developing the fundamental interests of the people the starting point and goal of all the work of the Party and country.” Using the key phrase “maintain the party’s purity,” China called for strict adherence to the party’s line, constitution and discipline by party members to increase their loyalty and quality, while emphasizing the need to strive to prevent corruption and “serve the people” because, “Combating corruption and promoting political integrity, which is a major political issue of great concern to the people, is a clear-cut and long-term political commitment of the party.” In the background there seems to be a keen sense of crisis that deteriorating qualities of party members due to corruption might affect people’s trust in the party, which could lead to the loss of unifying force of the party and further undermine the one-party rule.

There have been frequent mass protests directly linked to people’s interests.

The Work Report pointed to income disparities and environmental pollution as “difficulties and problems on our road ahead” and indicated that “social problems have increased markedly.”

Against the backdrop to these social problems, there have been frequent mass protests concerning issues directly involving compelling interests of people in 2012 as well. In Chongqing’s Wansheng district, residents blocked highways in large-scale protests against the lowered level of social security associated with the merging of districts (April). In the cities of Shifang, Sichuan province, and Qidong, Jiangsu province, local residents protested against the construction of a factory and a sewage facility due to concerns about health hazards caused by possible environmental pollution.

Some of the protesters turned violent and burst into local government facilities or vandalized police cars (July). In Ningbo, Zhejiang province, several thousands of residents opposing the construction of a chemical factory demanded retraction of the construction and resignation of the mayor, which developed into a conflict with the security authority (October).

China tried to stabilize society by accepting people's demands and improving their livelihoods.

In response to these mass protests, some local parties/governments worked for an early resolution to the situation by partially accepting the residents' demands or calling off the construction. At the "national comprehensive work conference for social management" in July, Zhou Yongkang, Secretary of the Central Commission of Political and Legislative Affairs, who was in charge of security management stressed the need to stabilize society by improving people's livelihoods and curing root causes of problems, advocating "a shift from traditional regulation-based management towards service-oriented management." At the base of this flexible stance, there may be a keen sense of crisis that traditional measures to smother public discontent by force could further foment discontent with the party and government.

China stood firm with one-party rule based on "public security management by force" at the same time.

At the 18th National Congress, the Communist Party of China positioned "improvement of people's living" as a priority issue and announced a policy to avoid confrontation of the party/government with the people when possible by working on "issues involving most direct and realistic interests of the greatest concern to the people." However, because an excessive tendency to "focus on public opinion" could lead to further escalation of demands and social disruption, China has secured public order by dispatching security forces when mass protests have continued after a proposal of "compromise" by the party/government. China will likely continue "public security management by force" vigorously to maintain the stability of society if it finds risk of damage to the party's regime and national interests in handling such moves of people, while displaying consideration to public opinions.,

Xi Jinping leadership will face increasing difficulties in handling of the government.

Because social problems such as income disparity, environmental pollution and corruption by core members of the party/government remain serious, the new leadership of Xi Jinping may want to demonstrate legitimacy of the one-party rule by announcing "focus on public opinion" including increasing of people's income based on stable economic growth and anti-corruption measures. However, with China's GDP growth rate of January to September slowing to 7.7% and the economic growth that has been deemed to be "key to the solution of every problem" beginning to decline, it is believed that the new leadership will face even more difficulties in handling the government than the Hu Jintao leadership did.

- (4) In response to the re-election of President Ma Yingjeou, China intensified its efforts to foster an environment that would promote “peaceful unification.”
- China struggled to deepen China-Taiwan economic relations and build political relations of trust.
 - Taiwan planned to ensure space for “diplomacy” by announcing “East China Sea Peace Initiative.”

Continuation of the Kuomintang regime increased the closeness of China-Taiwan relations with focus on the economic field.

In Taiwan, President Ma Yingjeou of Kuomintang was re-elected in the presidential election in January. Kuomintang maintained a majority in the legislative election that was carried out simultaneously.

Considering the re-election of Ma Yingjeou to be an achievement of its past measures concerning Taiwan, China announced a policy to further strengthen the “political, economic, cultural and social basis” toward “peaceful unification” (March). China worked to further expand economic exchange by increasing individual Chinese tourists to Taiwan and signing “an agreement to promote investment protection” in August. China also called for proactive efforts by Taiwan toward construction of political relations. For example, then-General Secretary Hu Jintao said to a Taiwanese dignitary, “The furtherance of mutual political trust is the most important key to the development of ties” (March). In its Work Report of the 18th National Congress in November, China announced a policy to work for the “establishment of a cross-strait confidence-building mechanism for military security” and “a peace agreement.”

Taiwan insisted on its sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands and the South China Sea, and China proposed cooperation.

Amid continuing conflicts among countries involved in the Senkaku Islands and the South China Sea, Taiwan moved to ensure its space for diplomacy by claiming its sovereignty over them, while calling for participation in dialogues and talks. Concerning the conflict over the Senkaku Islands, President Ma Yingjeou announced “East China Sea Peace Initiative” (August) and “East China Sea Peace Initiative Implementation Guidelines” (September), advocating joint development as well as Japan-Taiwan, China-Taiwan and Japan-China bilateral talks. In addition, he expressed Taiwan’s decision to expand the concept to the South China Sea issues (October). In response to these moves by Taiwan, China, while keeping watch for the expansion of Taiwan’s sovereignty, repeatedly stressed the need for cooperation by stating, “Both sides of the strait should work together to safeguard the nation’s territorial integrity and interests of the people” (Jia Qinglin, Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, September).

It is believed that China will intensify its appeal to Taiwan toward new achievements including cooperation in territorial issues and progress in the political field, while promoting economic and cultural exchanges.

3. Russia

- (1) As President Putin's popularity declined, Russia struggled to stabilize the regime.
- Russia launched conciliatory moves including national dialogues to recover its approval rating.
 - At the same time it pushed ahead with public opinion control on alert against "anti-Putin" moves.

Prime Minister Putin was restored to the head of state in spite of declining approval ratings.

Public protests starting from the alleged improprieties by the government in the lower house elections (December 2011) spread to "anti-Putin" campaigns on a national scale, and the approval rate of Prime Minister Putin, which had been nearly 90%, fell to the 60% level. A presidential election was implemented in this situation (March).

Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, the presidential candidate of the ruling party "United Russia," made the campaign promise to promote national dialogues to recover his popularity while calling for solidarity of the Russian state. As a result, he won the election, gaining about 64% of the votes and regained his position as President, four years after his previous term. Before his inauguration in May, Putin promoted "democratization" measures such as relaxing of the requirements for forming a new party (April), introduction of direct elections of local governors, and relaxing of the requirements for running for presidential elections (May) in an effort to impress the new administration's democratic stance.

Tightening of regulation on civil activities could weaken the president's power to close ranks.

While taking these appeasement measures, the Putin administration, driven by a sense of vigilance toward anti-Putin movements, which would not calm after the installation of the new government (May), enacted laws to stifle domestic criticism of the government as well as intervention by international organizations, including stricter penalties against unlawful behavior during demonstrations/rallies (June), stronger supervision over nonprofit organizations with foreign support (July) and revision of criminal law concerning treason (November), in rapid succession.

Considering that the presence of middle-class people feeling distrust against the regime is increasing, especially in cities, the hard-line stance of President Putin could harden public opinion and accelerate the decline of his popularity. The president, who will take the helm of Russia for the next six years, could have a tough time due to a number of tasks, such as to break away from the vulnerable economy dependent on natural resources, overcome serious corruption, and develop Far-East regions, where the population drain is serious.

(2) Russia worked to strengthen relations with Asia-Pacific countries with a focus on China.

- Russia set up the Ministry for Development of Russian Far East and held ASEAN Summit in Vladivostok.
- While working toward further expansion of economic relationship with China, Russia remained vigilant toward China in security issues.

President Putin took a clear stance to place emphasis on Asia.

Just after taking office in May, President Putin set up the Ministry for Development of Russian Far East to manage development programs of underdeveloped Far-East/East Siberian regions and issued a presidential decree to order strengthening of the relations with Asia-Pacific countries including China. At a summit of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) held in Vladivostok (September), the president stressed the importance of regional economic integration and announced Russia's intention of active involvement in the process, thus again showing the stance to place emphasis on Asia.

Regarding the rapid rise of China, Russia intended to increase its presence through diplomatic relations with Asian countries.


Russia demonstrated the firm "strategic partnership" with China through a Russia-China joint naval maneuver in the Yellow Sea (April) and a Russia-China summit in Beijing (June). Especially in the economic front, President Putin announced a plan to expand the trade volume between the two countries from the current 83.5 billion dollars to 200 billion by 2020, showing a strong desire to expand the relations (June).

On the other hand, comments such as "a power-seeking regional leadership has emerged as a new threat" (by Defense Minister Serdyukov in March) and "it is our task to defend Russian Far East from excessive expansion of neighboring countries" (by Prime Minister Medvedev in August) showed a deep-seated fear of China in Russia.

Russia is actively strengthening relations with Asia-Pacific countries through expansion of arms exports to India, resource development with Vietnam, implementation of railway/port improvement projects with North Korea, and participation in the Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) (June to August), which indicates that the state is planning to maintain and increase its presence while keeping China in check through growing ties with these countries. It is believed that Russia will continue to develop wide-ranging diplomacy in the region.

Column: Russia's Arctic Ocean Policy

- In recent years the Arctic Ocean has been attracting attention because the diminishing sea ice brings about possibilities of developing untapped resources and new international ocean routes. Against this background, Russia has been making vigorous efforts to use the Arctic Ocean for its economy and security.
- In May, President Putin signed a presidential decree just after assuming office. The decree made it clear that Russia will increase its military presence in the Arctic Ocean by identifying the “rebuilding of the navy in the Arctic and Far East to protect strategic interests” as a future priority issue for Russian military. In July the president signed a bill setting out management of the Arctic Ocean routes, etc. With the comeback of President Putin, who has been leading North-Pole policy, it is believed that Russia will further increase strategic emphasis on the North Pole.
- Against this backdrop, China is stepping up moves of maritime expansion and showing increased strategic interest in the North Pole. As China has not yet received approval of its observer status in the Arctic Council, which is an organization for multilateral cooperation of Arctic countries, it protested against the “monopoly of Arctic interests” by these countries, by stating “the Polar areas belong to all mankind” (*2012 Ocean Report of China*). This might lead to friction with Russia and other Arctic countries in the future.
- China is also making efforts to strengthen the relations with Iceland concerning the Arctic Ocean. In April Premier Wen Jiabao officially visited Iceland and reached an agreement to intensify their cooperation in the Arctic areas. In addition, China dispatched the 5th arctic expedition between July and September (the latest navigation route of research icebreaker *Xue Long* is shown below).



- In regard to China's advance to the Arctic Ocean, it is worth noting that the route from China to the Arctic Ocean is basically via the Okhotsk Sea. The Okhotsk Sea is the area in which Russia's ballistic missile nuclear submarines are deployed and is, therefore, strategically critical for Russia. If China intensifies its advance to the Arctic Ocean and Chinese ships frequently navigate the Okhotsk Sea in the future, Russia will likely increase its vigilance and try to strengthen the control over that sea.
- In July, as part of a large-scale military exercise led by its Pacific Fleet, Russia implemented a land-to-sea missile launch exercise from southern Sakhalin to the Okhotsk Sea. On the same day, Chinese research icebreaker *Xue Long* (mentioned above) was navigating the sea area toward the Arctic Ocean. This may suggest that Russia intends to put a brake on China's advance to the Okhotsk Sea and Arctic Ocean.
- As described above, Russia's Arctic Ocean policy is now influenced by China's advance to the area. A feud between the two countries over the Arctic Ocean could intensify and the resulting situation might influence the security environment of the Far East, including the sea area off Japan. This also indicates the possibility that Russia would find more “strategic value” in Japan's northern territories.

(3) While indicating a willingness to settle the issue of the Northern Territories, Russia went ahead with taking Japan's Northern Territories within its own borders.

- Russia called for a stronger economic relationship with Japan toward creation of an atmosphere for territorial talks.
- There was progress in social/military infrastructure development in the Northern Territories as well as a move to introduce foreign capital in addition to the inflow of workforce and goods from third countries.

Russia stressed expansion of bilateral economic cooperation toward settlement of the territorial issue.

In a conference with foreign reporters (March) held before the presidential election, then-Prime Minister Putin stressed “the need for expanded bilateral cooperation including the economic field to realize constructive dialogues” for final settlement of the issue of the Northern Territories. After the inauguration of the new administration (May), through bilateral talks such as top-level and foreign ministerial conferences, Russia actively worked for expansion and strengthening of the economic relationship including expansion of trade/investment, technology cooperation in innovation and cooperation in resource exploitation in the Far East.

President Putin appears to have the view that Japan's technical and economic power is essential for acceleration of Far East development by leverage from holding APEC (September). Therefore, in spite of the issue of the Northern Territories, Russia is believed to further work on Japan to forge a relationship as “partners in the Asia-Pacific Region.”

In addition to domestic measures, Russia sought ways to involve third countries in its efforts to “take Japan's Northern Territories within its own borders.”

High-level officials of the Russian government continued to visit the Northern Territories, including Prime Minister Medvedev, who visited Kunashiri Island (July), and airport/hospital construction and other infrastructure development and reorganization/equipment renewal of stationary troops were also carried out. Against this background, a third-country company joined a port improvement project in Etorofu Island with a large quantity of materials and equipment being brought in for the project (May) and there was further third-country involvement in the development of Kunashiri Island, including North Korean workers engaging in church construction work.

The government of Sakhalinskaya oblast, which exercises jurisdiction over the four islands in effect, is planning to introduce investment and technologies to the Northern Territories from foreign countries, including China and South Korea, for infrastructure development and promotion of tourism and other industries. There is concern that Russia will get third countries involved to pursue the control of Japan's Northern Territories within its own borders.

4. Middle East/North Africa

Confusion continued in the Middle East and North Africa on the heels of the “Arab Spring.”

- Situations evolved into a mess in Syria.
- Elements of political, economic, and security instability continued.

The “Arab Spring” began in Tunisia in December 2010 and had a huge impact on Middle Eastern and North African countries; it led to regime change in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen, while Syria is still under great confusion.

In Syria, the Assad regime took measures to win people to its side, including a national referendum on a proposed new constitution (February), while at the same time trying to break down dissidents by using troops. Against this move, armed groups, including the “Free Syrian Army,” which mainly consists of army defectors, continued resistance, and dissident groups, including the “Syrian National Council,” established a new unified organization called the “National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces” (November). The United Nations estimates the death toll in clashes between dissidents groups and the Syrian national army since March 2011 to be more than 30,000 (October 2012). In response, the international community is mounting efforts to settle the Syria issue but is yet to find a solution as Russia and China exercised a veto over a proposed resolution condemning the Assad regime at the UN Security Council (February), for example. As countries surrounding Syria are feeling the impact of inflows of refugees and bombardments crossing the border, the prolonged conflict in Syria is becoming a destabilizing element in the Middle East.

In Libya, there has been progress in the political process, including a parliamentary election in July based on a roadmap toward democratization. However, ethnic/tribal divisiveness that had been suppressed under the Gaddafi regime came to the surface while the moves of remaining Gaddafi loyalists’ pose a security concern. Meanwhile, the US ambassador and three other Americans were killed in an attack on the US consulate in September. It appears that an armed Islamist extremist group was involved in the attack.

In Tunisia, a cabinet dominated by an Islamic moderate party “Ennahda,” which became the top party at the election in October 2011, was established (December 2011). However, Islamist radicals extended power backed by dissatisfaction with the regime’s secular stance. The Islamist radicals strongly demanded enforcement of Islamic law at their rallies in May, while causing violent incidents, including attacks on police stations and bars (May), an assault on an art exhibition (June), and an attack on a French local assemblyman (August).

In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood-based “Freedom and Justice Party” gained momentum at the

parliament and Advisory Council elections held since November 2011, and Mohamed Morsi of the party assumed presidency in June. The president conflicted with the military that ruled Egypt on an interim basis over the legitimacy of the parliamentary election, and made efforts to enhance his power base by dismissing military officials (August). However, in addition to unstable factors in politics and the economy, social instability continued, as seen in incidents such as an abduction of tourists including Americans by armed groups (February and March) and an assault on border patrol agents (August).

Column: Demonstrations protesting against a film insulting Islam took place in many countries

Demonstrations protesting that *Innocence of Muslims*, a film produced by an Egyptian American, insulted Islam took place all over the world in September.

The film was promoted by an American pastor, Terry Jones, who is famous for radical anti-Islamic thinking, and a digest version in Arabic was posted on YouTube (September 4), which rapidly heightened reactions and criticism in the Middle East and other Muslim countries that the film insulted the Prophet Mohammad.

As a result, protesting rallies by Muslims took place all over the world (see Note) and some of the demonstrators who turned violent clashed with security authorities. In Libya, an armed group attacked the US consulate in Benghazi, killing the US ambassador and others.

Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri praised the attack on the US consulate in Libya and urged for further similar attacks on the United States, while the Taliban posted a statement on its website *Voice of Jihad* calling for retaliation against the United States.

Protest rallies against the movie took place around the US embassy in Japan and the US consulate in Nagoya as well.

Note: Rallies took place in Lebanon, Egypt, Yemen, Tunisia, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Palestine, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, the United Kingdom, France, etc.

5. International Terrorism

- (1) Al-Qaeda and its affiliated organizations tried to adapt to the changing situation in Arab countries.
- Al-Qaeda tried to ensure its influence in Arab countries.
 - There was a change in the bases of al-Qaeda affiliated organizations.
 - “Lone-wolf” terrorists are posing a new threat.

Al-Qaeda was in decline but tried to ensure its influence in Arab countries.

After the death of Osama bin Laden in 2011, Ayman al-Zawahiri became the leader of al-Qaeda core (hereinafter “al-Qaeda”) with the principal base in the tribal region in the northwestern part of Pakistan, but al-Qaeda was further undermined by the loss of key members, including its Libyan cadre Abu Yahya al-Libi (died on June 4, 2012). Meanwhile, al-Qaeda tried to demonstrate its presence in 2012 by declaring that it had an American national abducted in Pakistan in August 2011 in its custody and by repeatedly demanding the US to release detained members in exchange for the hostage.

Al-Qaeda issued statements successively in accordance to the changing situations in the countries where the “Arab Spring” led to the fall of a heavy-handed regime creating a security gap. In 2012, Zawahiri issued at least 19 statements, eight of which were calls to Muslims in specific Arab countries. As various Islamic forces that had previously been suppressed increased their presence in countries that went through the “Arab Spring,” Zawahiri stepped up his appeals to radical Islamist forces by repeating that they should defeat “intervention by the US and other Western countries,” and establish an “Islamic state.” He also called for a “revolution” in Arab countries where there was not yet any large anti-government movement.

Against this backdrop, militant groups declaring their support to al-Qaeda appeared in some Arab countries/regions. In Libya, a seemingly radical Islamist group admitted to having conducted the bombing attack on the US consulate in Benghazi (June 6) in the east part of the country and claimed that it was a reprisal for the attack on the Libyan al-Qaeda cadre mentioned above (June 11). In the Sinai Peninsula of the northern Egypt, a seemingly radical Islamist group admitted to have conducted a cross-border attack on southern Israel in June, and pledged allegiance to Zawahiri in July.

In addition to these moves, it was pointed out that some al-Qaeda members from Arab countries returned to their home countries from Pakistan where they had been hiding. Especially in Libya, where the security situation deteriorated significantly after the collapse of the Gaddafi regime in 2011, al-Qaeda may be extending its influence, taking advantage of the “Arab Spring.”

Al-Qaeda-affiliated organizations continued terrorist activities under the changing situations of the regions where their bases were located.

“Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)” together with its affiliated organization “Ansar al-Sharia” established so called Islamic emirates in various parts of Abyan and Shabwa provinces in southern Yemen, taking advantage of the country’s political unrest due to the impact of the “Arab Spring,” and controlled most of the provinces in March. However, they lost control of the regions in June as Interim President Hadi, who was elected in February, enhanced counterterrorism measures. AQAP had conducted large-scale attacks, including a suicide attack on the presidential palace in Mukalla (February), an attack on a Yemen military base in Abyan province (March), and a suicide attack on a military parade rehearsal in the capital city Sanaa (May). After losing the territory under its control, AQAP hinted at enhanced attacks on government officials, security agencies and foreign interests, and then conducted a series of terrorist attacks with diverse targets and methods, including a suicide attack on a police academy in Sanaa (July), attempted assassination of the defense minister (September), bombing of a gas pipeline (September) and the murder of an Iraqi military advisor (October). In addition, AQAP focused on propaganda activities including issuance of the 8th and 9th issues of its English organ paper *Inspire* (May).

Seizing on the battle between the government troops and “Azawad National Liberation Movement,” which seeks the independence of northern Mali, “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)” together with AQIM-affiliated organizations “Ansar Dine” and “Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa” occupied the region (June). AQIM and the affiliated organizations enforced Islamic law in the region while building their bases by setting up training camps and arming major towns. Amid mounting concerns of the international community about the partition of Mali and the development of “safe havens” for AQIM and others in the north part of the country, AQIM warned against military intervention by the international community using French hostages abducted in Niger in 2010 (September). In spite of the strict control by authorities in Algeria, AQIM conducted an attack on police vehicles in Tizi Ouzou province (April), a suicide attack on a gendarmerie headquarters in Ouargla province (June), and other acts.

After the full withdrawal of the US troops in Iraq in December 2011, “Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)” conducted serial bombings in Shiite living quarters in Baghdad in the same month and serial terrorist attacks targeting Shiite residents in the city and other places (June and September 2012). AQI had been believed to be losing its strength due to cleanup operations by US troops in Iraq, but the series of terrorist attacks indicate that AQI still has the strong capability to conduct terrorist acts. It is also pointed out that AQI might be stepping up operations in the neighboring Syria, seizing the confused situation there.

Due to the enhanced security measures by the interim government of Somalia and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), “Al-Shabaab” lost its core cities in the country one after

another and lost also Kismayo, a port town in the southern region that had been playing an important role for its funding, recruiting and other functions, in October. In response, al-Shabaab demonstrated its stance to enhance terrorist activities by announcing together with al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri (February) that it had joined al-Qaeda and conducted a suicide attack in the capital city Mogadishu (February), an attack on a base of the Somali interim government troop in Gedo province (March), the bombing of a national theater (April), the murder of a former trade minister (July), and a suicide attack targeting the new president Mohamud (September). The serial attacks on churches in Garissa (Kenya, in July) were allegedly carried out also by al-Shabaab.

Threat of “lone-wolf home-grown terrorists” poses a concern in Western countries.

Al-Qaeda and some of its affiliated organizations conducted terrorist attacks through recruited personnel, while at the same time encouraging spontaneous terrorist acts by persons who support their claims. In recent years, concerns are mounting over so-called “lone-wolf” terrorists in particular among Western “home-grown terrorists” who turn radical under the influence of ideas of al-Qaeda and others. Such “lone-wolf” terrorists plan and practice terrorist acts alone or in a small group without active instruction or support by a terrorist organization.

Among al-Qaeda affiliated organizations, AQAP has been calling for such spontaneous terrorism in Western countries through its English organ paper *Inspire*. In June 2011, al-Qaeda called for “individual acts of jihad,” namely, “to inflict harm alone or in a small group upon the enemy in the United States, the United Kingdom, France or any country fighting the Muslims.”

Against this backdrop, in France an Algerian French man (aged 23 at the time) shot and killed three children and a teacher who were Israeli nationals and three French soldiers from March 11 to 19. Later, the besieged perpetrator called himself a member of al-Qaeda and claimed that he had conducted the acts “in retaliation for Palestinian children” and “in retaliation to French Forces intervening in other countries.” (Later the perpetrator was shot dead by security forces.) The crime deeply shocked society because of his cruelty to chase and kill children who were trying to run away and the grotesqueness of filming his own crime scene.

It is indicated that the perpetrator may have become radical under the influence of his family and that he traveled to Pakistan in 2011 and underwent terrorist training by a radical Islamist group. However, he seems to have planned and executed the crime on his own. The incident highlighted the threat posed by such “lone-wolf” terrorists because it is more difficult to grasp their moves compared with those operating in groups, and it is also difficult to detect and identify them as terrorists.

The Threat of al-Qaeda and other organizations in Japan.

As has been stated above, the threat posed by al-Qaeda, its affiliated organizations and so-called home-grown terrorists remained after the death of Osama bin Laden. Japan has been named more than once by al-Qaeda as a target for terrorist acts (2008, etc.), and members of international

terrorist organizations have illegally entered Japan on multiple occasions (from 1999 to 2003). In addition, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, one of the leaders of al-Qaeda, has admitted to planning terrorist attacks against the US Embassy in Japan (2007). More recently, because al-Qaeda is announcing its radical beliefs and strategies to a wider audience through the Internet and other means, continued vigilance is necessary against the threat to Japan posed by al-Qaeda and others.

Column: Boko Haram of Nigeria

Nigerian radical Islamist group “Boko Haram” (meaning “Western education is sin” in the local language) seems to have been established around 2002 and calls for rule by Islamic law and expulsion of Western education in Borno state, where the majority of residents are Muslims, in the northwestern part of the country.

At the beginning, Boko Haram’s activities were limited to gun or knife attacks on government agencies and Christian churches in the northern region. However, the group attacked police stations to rescue its founder Mohammed Yusuf in 2009, resulting in a huge number of casualties. Further in 2011, Boko Haram expanded its action to the capital region while escalating attacks including a suicide attack using a car bomb against UN facilities. “Boko Haram” may be supported by “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)” in terms of terrorist training, etc.

In spite of the recent enforcement of measures against “Boko Haram” by the government, it remains active in the northern region as seen in the bombing attacks on eight government-related facilities in Kano state (January) and suicide attacks using car bombs against three churches in Kaduna state (June). Its moves and possible strengthening of ties with AQIM need to be monitored.

(2) Taliban and the forces supporting it remained active in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

- In Afghanistan, the Japanese Embassy suffered damage while Taliban demonstrated its presence.
- In Pakistan, the “Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan” (Pakistan Taliban Movement) continued terror attacks targeting the military.

With the withdrawal of foreign troops, Taliban remained aggressive in Afghanistan.

As the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is scheduled to complete its combat mission in Afghanistan by the end of 2014, the US and other involved countries are moving ahead with phased withdrawal of their respective troops, while at the same time working on reinforcement of Afghanistan security units so that the country will become capable of maintaining domestic security on its own.

Meanwhile, the Taliban, which is actively continuing terrorist operations in Afghanistan, showed a flexible stance at one time by having a talk with US government officials in Doha, the capital of Qatar, at the end of January with the aim of setting up a political office and exchanging “captives” with the US. However, the Taliban declared discontinuation of the talk in mid-March and conducted a number of terrorist attacks targeting security units including ISAF and government officials. In a series of terrorist attacks in the capital city Kabul in April, in particular, terrorists who occupied a building under construction launched rockets for a day and a night at the area where foreign delegations were concentrated, causing damage to part of the Japanese Embassy and the ambassador’s residence. Security in Afghanistan remained unstable as a core member who had been pursuing reconciliation with anti-government armed groups was assassinated in May following the assassination of another member in September 2011, while at the same time a feud between peace-seekers and hard-liners within the Taliban became apparent.

Upon such occasions as US soldiers’ burning of the Koran in Iraq (February) and murdering residents (March), as well as the distribution of a video insulting the Prophet Muhammad (September), the Taliban called for retaliation against ISAF soldiers. It is likely that the Taliban is skillfully using such anti-American sentiment in the background of frequent “insider attacks” by Afghanistan security personnel against ISAF soldiers.

In November, the UN Security Council listed “Haqqani Network,” which is believed to be a hard-core group in the Taliban, to be subject to sanction measures such as asset freezing, due to its repeated suicide attacks and assassinations in the capital city of Kabul.

In Pakistan, “Pakistan Taliban Movement” continued terrorist activities in spite of the alleged feud among core members.

When “Pakistan Taliban Movement (TTP),” an active group supporting the Taliban in Pakistan, decided in March to demote the second-in-command of the group for allegedly pushing peace negotiation with the government of Pakistan without approval from the leadership, it was interpreted as showing a deepened split among the core members, which had been pointed out before. However, the TTP continued to conduct terrorist acts and demonstrated a strong ability to execute terrorist attacks. Especially in the attack on a jail in Bannu, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (April), the TTP helped more than 380 prisoners to escape, including those who attempted to assassinate the former president Musharraf. During an attack on the Minhas airbase in Kamra, Attock district, Punjab province (August), the perpetrators entered the base and partly damaged one of the military aircraft. In October, the group attracted world attention by shooting a young girl demanding the right for women to be educated.

Meanwhile, the TTP, which is based in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in the northwestern part of the country, and other groups supporting the Taliban, established a joint council named “Shura-e-Murakeba” in January with the aim of stepping up attacks on the US troops in Afghanistan and prohibiting violence against ordinary citizens. Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan may have been involved in setting up the council, which attracted attention as a new move toward cooperation by groups supporting the Taliban. However there has been no specific move indicating the council’s activity, and terrorist attacks victimizing civilians continued in the FATA and other places.

Again this year, terrorist attacks targeting Shiite residents took place in different parts of Pakistan, and the TTP and another radical Islamist organization “Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ),” were allegedly involved in these attacks.

(3) Radical Islamist and communist organizations posed threats in South East Asia.

- In Indonesia, groups influenced by Jemaah Islamiyah continued terrorist acts.
- In the Philippines, an organization targeting Japanese companies and others firmly maintained its militant line.

In Indonesia, new small groups appeared and conducted a series of terrorist attacks.

In Indonesia there has been no terrorist act by “Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)” since 2009. It is believed that JI’s capability to execute terrorist acts has been reduced due to a crackdown by the authorities. Meanwhile, “Jemaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT),” an overt organization set up by JI’s former supreme leader, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir (currently in jail), was listed to be subject to sanctions by the United Nations (March) but continues propaganda as a legal organization. Statements justifying attacks against security authorities to “topple renegade tyrants” issued by Ba’asyir and other extremists from jail have spread through news media and Internet media operated by persons associated with JI as well as JAT, while the authorities were unable to come up with effective measures against the spread of extremism.

Against this backdrop, a number of small groups appeared, planned and executed terrorist attacks targeting police and others, as was the case in 2011. In August, a group of persons aged around twenty, fellow alumni of a boarding school established by JI founders including Ba’asyir, shot policemen dead, claiming that this was retaliation for antiterrorism measures. In September, about 10 people claiming to be “al-Qaeda in Indonesia” were detected just before executing simultaneous terrorist attacks targeting police facilities and others in the capital city of Jakarta. It was found that the group had a training base in Poso in Central Sulawesi, where JI had spread extremism and conducted recruitment and training. Later, in October, two policemen were abducted and killed in Poso, while at the same time an unknown hacker defaced local governments’ Websites, posting “a challenge” in the name of “Jihadi Commander of East Indonesia” to the national police, which was “assisted by the US.” No direct instruction or support for these cases by existing organizations such as JI was found. Small groups influenced by JI may be continuing terrorist acts.

The Communist Party of the Philippines did not agree to enter a peace talk and its military wing continued to attack private companies.

In the Philippines, the Philippine Communist Party’s military wing, New People’s Army (NPA), conducted an attack on mines in which Japanese companies had invested (October 2011). After attacking a Japanese-affiliated fresh produce company (January), it declared that it would continue armed attacks, naming foreign-affiliated companies along with the Japanese-affiliated companies

above as targets (March). Meanwhile, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) agreed on a framework for peace with the government (October), but the NPA and factions of the MILF that refuse to enter peace talks continue to be concerns in the island.

Column: Terrorist attacks against Israeli interests were conducted one after another.

Since January, terrorist attacks (including attempted attacks) against Israeli interests were conducted one after another in Europe, Asia and other regions (see the table below). Iranian nationals were arrested for some of the attacks, and it is possible that a Shiite organization, “Hezbollah,” was involved.

The US government stated that the suicide attacks in Bulgaria (note) “have the characteristics of those of Hezbollah” and indicated a connection with Iran for the attacks in Azerbaijan, Georgia, India, and Thailand.

As the background to the series of attacks is not yet known, the international community is tightening security against possible occurrences of similar attacks.

Note: The Bulgarian interior minister pointed out on July 20 that the case was a suicide bombing attack.

Date	Outline of major terrorist attacks against Israeli interests
Jan. 27	Three Azerbaijan nationals were arrested in the capital city of Baku on a charge of attempted murder of an Israeli teacher and other people.
Feb. 13	An Israeli Embassy driver found explosives placed in an embassy vehicle in the capital city of Tbilisi, Georgia
Feb. 13	A man riding a motorbike placed and set off explosives on a vehicle waiting at a red light in the capital city of New Delhi, India, injuring four people, including the wife and children of an Israeli military attaché who were in the car.
Feb. 14	An explosion occurred in a private residence leased by an Iranian in the capital city of Bangkok, Thailand. A plan to attack Israeli diplomats was detected.
Jun. 19	Two Iranians were arrested on a charge of planning attacks on the Israeli Embassy and other targets in the capital city of Nairobi, Kenya.
Jul. 7	A Swede born in Lebanon purported to be a member of Hezbollah was arrested on a charge of planning attacks on Israeli tourists in Limassol, southern Cyprus.
Jul. 18	A bus full of tourists who had arrived on an aircraft from Israel was attacked by a suicide bomber at Burgas Airport in the eastern part of Bulgaria. At least six people were killed and 32 people were injured.

6. Adverse Activities against Japan

Countries causing concern continued activities to obtain dual-use materials/technologies and critical information.

- Iran and North Korea continued the development of WMDs.
- Proliferation of dual-use materials/technologies via China was exposed.
- There are concerns of intensified cyber attacks and intelligence activities by foreign countries in Japan.

There was concern about the procurement of WMD-related materials by Iran and North Korea.

In spite of the repeated UN Security Council resolutions demanding discontinuation of nuclear-related and ballistic-missile-related activities, Iran and North Korea continued the development of WMDs, and there was concern about their procurement of WMD-related materials.

Iran did not allow inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of Parchin military facilities, which are believed to be used for explosion testing for nuclear development. The country moved ahead with the dismantlement of the related buildings, continued uranium enrichment, and launched a medium-range ballistic missile Shahab-3 (July). North Korea launched a missile which it called a “satellite” (April) and announced the continuation of ballistic missile development by stating it “will continue launching applications satellites as needed” (October).

While Iran and North Korea continued the development of WMDs, the expert panels of the UN Security Council’s Iran Sanctions Committee and North Korea Sanctions Committee pointed out in their respective annual reports that Iran was planning to procure high-performance carbon fiber for centrifugal separation for nuclear development, and that the procurement/provision of some embargoed items for North Korea was made through Dalian, China (June).

Meanwhile, it was reported that four vehicles were exported from China to North Korea in August 2011, and those shown at the military parade on the 100th anniversary of Kim Il Sung’s birth (April) were of the same model (June). This indicates concern that North Korea may be procuring WMD-related materials from China.

In Japan, semiconductor production equipment with a built-in program that falls under the category of technologies for which an export permit from the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry is required was exported to China without the permit and might have been carried into an arms factory

there (July). The exporting company and its director were sentenced to a fine for violation of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (November).

Concern of intelligence activities by foreign countries.

A Taiwanese military personnel working at a base with a radar system was arrested for providing confidential information to China (February), and a Canadian military personnel who was suspected to have provided confidential information to Russia admitted the charge in court (October). There were continued concerns about intelligence activities conducted by foreign countries in Japan as well.

When papers were sent to prosecutors concerning the suspected violation of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act by a Chinese embassy secretary, reports were made on the threats of intelligence activities by foreign countries in Japan (May).

There were repeated cyber-attacks against Japan.

There were repeated cases of cyber-attacks with the apparent aim of obtaining sensitive political, military, diplomatic or advanced technology information owned by the Japanese government and private companies. The Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization and the Ministry of Finance announced that their multiple personal computers had been infected by malware with a possible data leak in May and July respectively. The perpetrators of these attacks have not yet been identified but there is concern that they could be cyber intelligence activities involving foreign intelligence agencies.

There were also defacing of websites and Denial of Service (DoS) attacks by hacker groups aiming to protest against measures taken by the Japanese government. A group proclaiming themselves to be related to the international hacker group “Anonymous” called for cyber attacks named “Operation Japan” in protest to the revised Copyright Act enacted in Japan (June). Furthermore, a group calling themselves members of a Chinese hacker group “Honker Union” called for cyber attacks against Japanese government agencies in coordination with protest activities in China against the Japanese government’s acquisition and retention of the Senkaku Islands (September). Though no serious damage due to these attacks was identified, continued vigilance is required against large-scale cyber-attacks by hacker groups and others targeting Japan’s important infrastructure.

The threat of adverse activities against Japan will continue.

With the international community strengthening export control, countries causing concern about proliferation, including Iran and North Korea, are expected to use increasingly sophisticated means, such as going through China, in order to obtain WMD-related materials. In Japan, foreign intelligence agencies are expected to intensify their activities for intelligence collection in the

context of the problems they face. There is also concern about cyber attacks by hacker groups and others targeting Japan's government agencies and private companies in order to demonstrate their principles and demands.

Column: Iran and North Korea continued their cooperative relations.

Confirming the cooperative relationship at the Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement

The Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement was held in Iran (August 26-31). From North Korea, Kim Yong Nam, President of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly, and Foreign Minister Pak Ui Chun, among others, attended the summit and had talks with the Supreme Leader Khamenei and President Ahmadinejad during their stay. The Supreme Leader showed a positive stance toward stronger ties by stating "we are prepared for a broad range of cooperation in various fields." Foreign Minister Pak Ui Chun and Iranian Minister of Science, Research and Technology Daneshjoo signed an agreement on cooperation in the academic, university education and technology fields, including cooperation in research/surveys, exchanges of students/researchers, and the setting up of a research institution in partnership between the two countries.

Military assistance to Syria by the two countries

It is believed that North Korea has been supporting Iran and Syria by dispatching military personnel and supplying weapons. There is also an observation that the country has supported Iran in the latter's ballistic missile development since the 1990s. In 2007, a Syrian building that was believed to be a nuclear facility built with technical assistance by North Korea became the target of an airstrike. Recently it was reported that North Korea and Iran were supporting chemical weapons development in Syria, where unrest continues, while the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps officially admitted that it dispatched its foreign task force to Syria.

Column: Frequent occurrences of cyber attacks

There were frequent occurrences of cyber-attacks such as DoS attacks and defacing of Websites by hacker groups and others also in 2012. A hacker group, “Anonymous,” which advocates Internet freedom, conducted cyber attacks against the governments of the US, the United Kingdom and China as well as Japan to protest the cyber-security bills of these countries. China’s so-called patriotic hacker groups conducted cyber attacks on Japan’s government and private companies around September 18, the anniversary of the Lake Liutiao Incident. Such cyber attacks with political ideas and principles called “hacktivism” are spreading globally. For example, when activities protesting the film that was accused of insulting the Prophet Mohammed intensified in many countries (September), organizations calling themselves the “cyber force” of Middle Eastern countries demanded the removal of the film from the Internet and stepped up cyber attacks on the United States and other countries.

The threat of intelligence activities using cyber space (cyber intelligence) is also high. Such activities targeting political, economic, military or advanced technology information held by government agencies or private companies were identified in many countries in the world. The high probability of foreign intelligence organs’ organizational involvement is pointed out in these activities targeting highly confidential information. In recent years, there are also concerns that they may try to steal information concerning the system vulnerability of the organizations that are possible targets of cyber attacks. Enhancing cyber security has become a critical issue in many countries.

III. Focal Issues of the Domestic Public Security Situation in 2012

1. Aum Shinrikyo

- (1) The period of surveillance on Aum Shinrikyo was renewed (fourth time), as the cult still poses a threat.
- The Public Security Examination Commission (PSEC) determined that Shoko Asahara still possesses de facto absolute influence on the group's activities.
 - The PSIA continues to implement surveillance activities properly and strictly and reinforces its efforts to eliminate or alleviate fear and anxiety in the community.

The PSEC decided to renew the period of surveillance (fourth extension)

The Public Security Intelligence Agency (PSIA) determined that the necessity remained to shed light on the activities of Aum Shinrikyo, which split into the mainstream group using the name of "Aleph" and the Joyu group using the name of "Hikarinowa" on the grounds of differences in viewpoints regarding

December 1999	The Organization Control Act enacted
January 2000	PSEC decision to implement surveillance.
February 2000	The cult was renamed "Religious Organization Aleph"
January 2003	PSEC decided to extend the surveillance period (1 st time).
February 2003	The cult was renamed "Religious Organization Aleph" (with long "a")
January 2006	PSEC decided to extend the surveillance period (2 nd time).
May 2007	The Joyu Group established "Hikarinowa."
May 2008	The mainstream group was renamed "Aleph."
January 2009	PSEC decided to extend the surveillance period (3 rd time).
January 2012	PSEC decided to extend the surveillance period (4 th time).
Development of surveillance over the cult	

Asahara's will or activity policy to achieve the goals. Therefore, the PSIA requested, in November 2011, the Public Security Examination Commission (PSEC) to extend the period of surveillance measures by the Director-General of the PSIA for the fourth time based on the Organization Control Act.

The PSEC, in accordance with its determination that Asahara still possesses de facto absolute influence on the group's activities, decided to extend the period of surveillance for three years (until January 31, 2015) on January 23. Regarding the threat of the cult, the PSEC pointed out that: (1) the group honorifically calls Asahara "Sonshi" and "guru," and still has faith in him, (2) the cult holds materials teaching dangerous dogmas that imply murder, (3) some senior members have made statements to justify the two sarin attacks, and (4) the cult is instilling a mindset to abandon own will and absolutely follow its dogma through training using methods of mind control.

The PSEC also pointed out that "Hikarinowa has not changed its basic nature and still constitutes an important part of the cult as it is preaching absolute faith in the dogma of Aum Shinrikyo and

maintains almost the same training system.”


The PSIA implemented surveillance over the cult properly and strictly based on the Organization Control Act.

The PSIA implemented a total of 57 on-site inspections of the cult’s facilities in 15 prefectures, including simultaneous inspections of 29 facilities across the country (November), which were conducted by approximately 300 public security intelligence officers. During the inspections, a large number of Asahara’s photographic portraits and teaching materials recording his preachings were found in all facilities of the mainstream group, while materials for recruiting based on his dogma were also found in the facilities with a training center for guidance and edification of lay followers.


In addition, the PSIA received four quarterly reports from the cult on its organization and activities in 2012. Based on the reports by the cult as well as the results of the PSIA’s on-site inspections and investigations, the PSIA provided 12 municipal governments in 4 prefectures with relevant information on a total of 42 occasions at their request.

The cult reported more than 200 new members in 2012, mostly in the Kinki region.

As described below, the cult recruited new followers, mostly targeting students and other young people by soliciting on downtown streets without mentioning its name or luring people to yoga classes through the Internet. As a result of all these activities, the cult reported 255 new members in its report for 2012, making the annual number of new followers over 200 for two consecutive years. Looking at the breakdown of new followers in 2012 by region, the Hokkaido and Kinki regions stand out.



Comparing the ages of followers at the end of October 2012 with those of 2008, the percentage of the young generation (age 34 or younger) in the entire cult increased from approximately 22% to 32%. In particular, followers in their twenties greatly increased, from approximately 7% to 19%. The percentage of elderly (age 65 or older) increased from approximately 4% to about 8% partly because followers got their family members to join the cult.



Remaining fearful and anxious about the cult, local residents held a series of rallies and demonstrations.

Residents living in areas near Aum Shinrikyo facilities remained fearful and anxious about the cult and conducted a series of protest rallies and demonstrations demanding the dissolution of the cult and the removal of its facilities.

The PSIA held 36 opinion-exchange meetings with local residents and provided explanations on the current state of the cult and the implementation of surveillance in an effort to alleviate public fear and anxiety concerning the group. In these meetings, local residents voiced their opinions such as, “The Aum problem is not over yet, because young people are still joining the cult” and, “What should we do when a threatening move is found in the cult’s facilities?”

Column: All the Aum Shinrikyo suspects on the special wanted list have been arrested, 17 years after the crimes

Makoto Hirata, a former senior member who was on the special wanted list for his alleged involvement in the abduction and confinement of a notary public office manager, appeared at a police station at midnight on December 31, 2011, and was arrested in the early hours of January 1. Akemi Saito, a former live-in member, turned herself in on the 10th of the same month and was arrested for the charge of hiding Hirata. Hirata had been hiding out in apartments rented by Saito under a false name and continued to escape, supported by Saito.

A former live-in member, Naoko Kikuchi, who was on the special wanted list for her alleged involvement in the subway sarin attacks, was arrested on June 3 by police officers who had received a report. Kikuchi had worked under a false name and lived with Katsuya Takahashi, but had been living with another man since March 2007.

Katsuya Takahashi, a former senior member who was on the special wanted list for his alleged involvement in the subway sarin attacks and other crimes was arrested on June 15 by police officers who had received a report. Takahashi had been working under a false name at a construction company and other places.

In response to the arrests of all suspects on the list, the mainstream group posted its statement “We will monitor future investigations” on the Aleph Website. Inside of the group, senior members stated that “the deterrent (against the execution of Asahara) is lost because they all have come out. If our hearts are detached from the guru, we will face a dangerous situation again,” and instructed their followers to step up their practice of praying to prevent Asahara’s execution. Meanwhile, the Joyu group posted comments regretting the incidents on the Hikarinowa Website.

<Indictment status of the cases in which the suspects on the special wanted list were allegedly involved>

Name	Cases	Indictment status (charge)
Makoto Hirata	Abduction and confinement causing death of a notary public office manager	Indicted on Jan. 20 (abduction and confinement)
	Bombing of a religion commentator’s house	Indicted on Feb. 20 (violation of the Explosives Control Act)
	Throwing of a Molotov cocktail at Aum Shinrikyo facilities	Indicted on Feb. 20 (violation of the Act Punishing Use, etc. of Glass Bottle Grenades)
Akemi Saito	Harboring a criminal	Indicted on Jan. 30 (harboring a criminal) * Mar. 27: First hearing judgment (one year and two months in prison) Jul. 20: Appeal court judgment (dismissal of appeal) Aug. 4: The judgment became final
Naoko Kikuchi	Subway sarin attacks	Aug. 31: The case was dropped
	Three cases including, VX murder Case of a parcel bomb sent to the Tokyo governor’s office	Aug. 31: The case was dropped Indicted on Aug. 6 (accessory to attempted murder, assistance with violation of the Explosives Control Act)
Katsuya Takahashi	Subway sarin attacks	Indicted on Jul. 6 (murder and attempted murder)
	Case of a parcel bomb sent to the Tokyo governor’s office	Indicted on Jul. 30 (attempted murder and violation of the Explosives Control Act)
	Three cases including, VX murder	Indicted on Aug. 31: (murder and attempted murder) *indicted for two of the three cases
	Abduction and confinement causing death of a notary public office manager and destruction of his corpse	Indicted on Sep. 24: (unlawful capture and confinement causing death, destruction of corpse)

(2) The mainstream group tried to strengthen its solidarity through commitment to its policy of getting back to Asahara.

- The group strengthened its guidance to ensure absolute faith in Asahara.
- The group conducted organization-wide recruitment activities targeting the young generation.

The group continued the dogma and training system established by Asahara to instill absolute faith in him.

Based on its policy of getting back to Asahara, the mainstream group provided thorough instruction to instill absolute faith in Asahara by putting portraits of him on altars. In the regular intensive seminars for lay members (January, May and September) the group instilled the need for Asahara and his dogma by making attendants repeat in chorus phrases such as “in order to ensure transmigration to a world with the guru, it is necessary to practice ‘tantra vajrayana’ in concert with Asahara’s preaching in a video. In addition, as a practice of the dogma and training system established by Asahara, the group made its followers pursue training of reading aloud and memorizing Asahara’s preaching from textbooks, repeated throwing down of their bodies on the ground while loudly chanting a pledge of faith in Asahara (standing worship), and yoga. In the intensive seminars held in May and September in particular, the group divided the participants into the beginners and the experienced based on the progress of their training. The latter group was strained to breaking point through training without rest or sleep and senior members spurred them on, saying, “Rely on the guru in times of travail,” “You have expressed your resolve to the *Sonshi*; continue training even if your bones crack.” Some of the lay members who attended the intensive seminars at the main site (Saitama) went around the Tokyo Detention House in which Asahara was detained, and meditated in the lotus position with an intention to absorb energy from Asahara.

In order to establish absolute faith in Asahara, the group had the followers drink water named “kanrosui (sweet water),” purportedly made by transforming the mantra chanted by Asahara into electric signals and putting it into water, and participate in training of repeating in chorus the full text of the “Mahayana Buddha Initiation,” which includes phrases demanding absolute faith in Asahara, such as, “Always think what the will of the guru is,” and, “Am I practicing the guru’s will?” In addition, they held a “birth celebration” around Asahara’s birthday in their facilities across the country as has happened in the past (February, March) and had the attending followers pray for the extension of Asahara’s life by chanting “please do not enter nirvana until all souls are saved” and watch videos of Asahara’s preaching.

Meanwhile some of the live-in members of the mainstream group attended rallies and events

appealing for the abolition of the capital punishment system and a stop to executions.

The group tightened the control of followers by introducing a screening system for live-in members.

The mainstream group tried to tighten the control of live-in and lay members toward a system to reach liberation and enlightenment.

For live-in members, the group introduced a program called *ko-bonno-metsujin-tagaku-nannnyo* to “create the stream of reaching liberation and enlightenment” for selected live-in members below the rank of “Shi” (master, core member). These members need to meet such requirements as more than 120 hours per month of exercise and completion of a certain level of studying textbooks with Asahara’s preachings, and their progress and living environment are controlled in an integrated fashion (January). With regard to this system, senior members stressed the importance of dedicating all one’s strength to the training because “when you truly exert every possible effort for the training, you will deepen your faith in the guru” and carried out thorough control of the selected live-in members by obliging them to report their daily training hours, ritual attendance rate and sleeping hours, among others.

For lay members, the group continued the “Maha Paramita System (introduced in 2010),” where lay members who actively engaged in the group’s activities such as religious training, donation and recruiting activities are selected with the precondition of faith in Asahara and compliance with instructions of live-in members among other things. They held special intensive seminars in which only selected lay members were allowed to participate separately from other lay members (January and July). The group also strengthened the system’s operation by setting new selection criteria for strict examination of applicants.

The mainstream group made ordination of lay members who were selected in the system and satisfied the requirements for ordination (ex. 600 hours of standing worship) purported to be set down by Asahara, for the first time in seven years (March).

The group deployed recruiting activities without mentioning the cult’s name, sometimes using malicious methods, which led to an arrest.

Just as last year, the group continued recruitment activities to expand the organization. Based on the instruction by “Seigoshi” Koichi Ninomiya, the group prepared a system for recruitment activities across the organization by increasing the number of senior members in training centers that recruited a large number of new followers, while pulling resident members out of training centers where the number of followers was not increasing much (January). In order to encourage its followers to make active efforts for recruitment, the group made lay members who were successful in recruiting new members present their experiences, while senior members urged members to make recruitment efforts, saying, “Each training center is expected to strengthen the will to guide souls to whom it is linked by fate,” at intensive seminars.

At universities in the Kanto and Kinki regions in April, when universities accept new students, and in May and November, when university festivals are held, live-in members who were not students of the universities posted university bulletin boards with notices for invitation to a group or club that was not approved by the university and solicited students while showing those notices. These groups used subtle recruitment methods, such as not mentioning the cult's name and concealing a religious ambiance from their names and activities.

In addition to continued solicitation on downtown streets, in bookstores and event sites, the group adopted new recruitment methods mainly targeting the young generation, who use the Internet more frequently. The activities included contacting people who showed interest in religion, yoga, divination and the spiritual world through social networking services (SNS) and luring them to a yoga training session or followers meeting that was operated by the group without mentioning the cult's name. In yoga classes, in particular, the group preached to the recruitment targets the teaching and dogma of Asahara without mentioning his name, making them watch videos such as "9.11 terrorist attacks were plots by the United States" for long hours and explaining that "the subway sarin attack was fabricated by the government."

In their recruitment activities using SNS, three lay followers who attended the group's Kyoto facilities were arrested by Shiga Prefectural Police for alleged fraud of making a man with whom they became acquainted through SNS join Aleph disguising that this was membership in a yoga class and beguiling him of an initial fee and monthly membership fee (May). Two of them were indicted in June.

The group intensified its efforts to defend the organization and hardened its confrontational stance against the PSIA.

Since the decision to extend the surveillance period for the fourth time, the mainstream group intensified its efforts to defend the organization by making strict identity checks of new followers and starting an initiative by live-in followers of the legal department to visit training centers across the country for direct instruction of countermeasures against voluntary inquiries by Public Security Intelligence Officers.

With regard to on-site inspections by the PSIA, in spite of the Public Security Examination Commission's determination indicating that the group made an "extremely dishonest response," the group continued to intensify its confrontational stance against the PSIA. Specifically, they caused a delay of starting the inspection by taking too long to open the facility gates, copying IDs of all officers by hand and reading out a protest document. During inspection, they did not follow the instructions of the officers, demanded an excessive number of witnesses, tenaciously shot a video of the officers and refused to answer officers' questions by saying, "It is as you can see," or "I am not obliged to answer the question," while repeating uncooperative acts such as loudly objecting to officers' touching Asahara's portrait or recording the state inside of the facility by photo or video,

suddenly shutting down a PC and placing plates protesting photo shooting around the object of shooting.

Column: The mainstream group published a new book compiling excerpts from the books written by Asahara.

- The mainstream group published a book titled <Practice> *Chakra and Kundalini: Secrets of Yoga Leading to Awakening and Liberation* through “Touousha,” the cult’s affiliated business, under the name of a fictitious author, “Hideyuki Sanada,” and started distributing it via its online shopping site (mid-June). This was the first publication of a book by the cult in nine years since Joyu’s book, *Talks of Fumihiko Joyu 2: Liberation of Heart and the World of Mystery*.
- The wrapper band of <Practice> *Chakra and Kundalini* reads “Yoga technique that helped awaken ten thousand people,” and, “The world of ancient yoga sutras is revived in the present” The book takes the form of a practical guide to yoga techniques on the surface and does not show any influence of Asahara. However, its content is mostly excerpts from the books and journals published by the cult in the past, including Asahara’s book, *Transcending Life and Death* (published in December 1986). In addition to current followers’ stories praising Asahara—such as, “I realized the terrific power of Aleph training,” and, “Led by the guru, I have gone through the great ‘human evolution’”—the book includes Asahara’s sermon titled, *The Process to Enlightenment and Apramāñi*, declaring his “enlightenment” (at “Tanzawa seminar” in December 1986), which makes the book a reprint of his book in effect.
- The Organization to Support the Victims of Crimes Committed by Aum Shinrikyo demanded that the mainstream group stop selling DVDs of Asahara’s sermons in July 2011, claiming that “all copyrights of the cult have been transferred by the Aum Shinrikyo bankruptcy trustee to the Organization” and applied with the Tokyo Summary Court for conciliation for civil affairs, demanding on March 5 that the mainstream group not reproduce, distribute, or sell the cult’s writings.

- (3) The Joyu group continued adhering to the line of “hiding the influence of Asahara” and conducted propaganda activities to claim a stance of “breaking away from Asahara.”
- The group conducted active propaganda trying to turn Aum-related news into an opportunity.
 - The group continued promulgation/propaganda activities using the Internet.

The group conducted propaganda activities taking advantage of the news of arrests of the suspects on the special wanted list.

Following 2011, the Joyu group continued propaganda activities to insist to society that “Hikarinowa had broken away from Asahara,” actively utilizing various media. Fumihiro Joyu, in particular, taking the opportunity of increased requests for interviews from various media in 2012 due to a string of arrests of Aum suspects on the special wanted list, readily gave interviews with media such as TV and magazines. He pushed propaganda for his “breaking away from Asahara” by making a comment that the arrests of the suspects on the special wanted list was “a step toward the complete settlement of Aum incidents,” while stressing “reflection and review” on the series of Aum incidents.

There is no change in the fact that the group remains under the influence of Asahara.

Maintaining the existing live-in member and training systems, the Joyu group held intensive seminars for lay members and others following 2011 (January, May and August) and implemented a ritual (known as special empowerment), which is akin to the “initiation” that used to characterize the training under Asahara, as it had done in 2011. While visiting facilities across the country every month to make his own sermons, Joyu defended Asahara before lay members by preaching, “We need to thank Asahara for feeding us,” and, “They (victims of the sarin attacks) are simply thinking, ‘Why is this happening to us alone?’” without consideration for the victims.


The group stepped up self-claimed “external audit” and strengthened its approach to local residents.

The Joyu group set up a Hikarinowa External Audit Committee consisting of members chosen by the group (December 2011). Because the Public Security Examination Commission added the comment, “We will watch whether the measures such as the audit system will be implemented to change the nature of the group based on the sincere remorse regarding its past wrong deeds and whether it is producing results” upon deciding to extend the surveillance period for the fourth time (January), the group stepped up activities claimed to be “external audit.” They held regular meetings with the External Audit Committee (February) and started a questionnaire survey of participants of sermons, asking, “Is there anything calling for absolute faith in the former leader

Asahara?” for example (February). In addition, the group set up a website titled “From Hikarinowa to People of the Community” (May) as an approach to local residents opposing the cult’s activities. Meanwhile, some branches/training centers of Hikarinowa in western Japan pressed on with Joyu’s sermons in spite of residents’ asking to stop activities in the facilities.

The group conducted recruitment activities utilizing the Internet.

With the number of live-in members falling since the establishment of Hikarinowa, the Joyu group called for participation in various events from a segment targeting the general public on its website. Joyu himself conducted recruitment activities to maintain and expand the organization by posting the schedule of various events on his own blog, “Fumihiko Joyu Official Blog: Creating Ideas of the 21st Century” and held round-table talks inviting



citizens through SNS. As a result, partly due to increased media exposure of Joyu as described above, a large number of citizens attended his sermon sessions and intensive seminars. The group also set up a website titled, “Charges and Measures against Aleph Issues” (February), aiming to attract mainstream group members.

The group continued activities in Ukraine and the Russian Federation.

The group’s senior members, including Joyu, visited Ukraine and held seminars attended by dozens of Russian followers who visited the country (February, May and September). Joyu preached based on the textbook of Hikarinowa and had private interviews at the seminars. The group taught its Russian followers on a routine basis through an audio/video-call service using an Internet connection, and through occasions where followers directly received guidance from senior members who were sent to the Russian Federation (April and November).

Column: Delusiveness of the media strategy of Fumihiro Joyu

As described above, Fumihiro Joyu found that the increased requests for interviews from various media outlets were a good opportunity and pushed propaganda of his “breaking away from Asahara,” by stating, “I started to depart from faith in Aum around 2002,” and, “I became independent from Asahara and established Hikarinowa,” for example, in TV and magazine interviews.


However, Joyu made sermons such as “The guru is the foundation of our faith” in 2002, and was far from “starting to depart from faith in Aum.” Furthermore, he provided followers with explanations such as, “We should firmly maintain faith in the guru and create a different form (of organization) based on his idea,” and, “It is not against the will of the guru to consider objects of worship that are linked with him” at the time of establishing Hikarinowa. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that Joyu established Hikarinowa as independent from Asahara.

Facilities where on-site inspections were carried out

(From January to end of November 2012)

Explanation

Facility name	Inspection date
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2. Moves of domestic groups concerning events that drew attention from society

(1) Moves of domestic groups concerning the nuclear issue.

- Radical leftist groups and the JCP criticized the government, taking advantage of the spreading anti-nuclear movement.

Radical leftist groups and the JCP participated in activities by anti-nuclear organizations opposing the restart of nuclear power plants.

Concerning nuclear power generation, various protests calling for abandonment of nuclear power generation or against the restart of nuclear power plants took place in many parts of the nation, including in front of the Prime Minister’s Office, around the Diet and locations of nuclear power plants. Especially on March 11, the first anniversary of the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant, rallies and demonstrations calling for a “stop to all nuclear power plants” took place in various locations, including Fukushima City. Since April, protests against the restart of the Oi nuclear power plant units 3 and 4 took place in front of the Prime Minister’s Office every Friday, gathering approximately 60,000 people in total in four rallies during one month after the decision of the restart (June). Upon the restart of Oi nuclear power plant (July) more than a dozen vehicles of protestors blocked the roads near the gate of the plant.

With the spread of anti-nuclear movements, radical leftist groups and the JCP mobilized their activists and party members to rallies and demonstrations, and criticized the government while opposing the restart, demanding a shutdown and decommissioning of all reactors.

Among Radical leftist groups, “Chukaku-ha” showed a significant move.

Radical leftist groups joined rallies and demonstrations of anti-nuclear organizations and demanded an immediate shutdown and decommissioning of all reactors while distributing their respective organ papers and leaflets. Among them “Chukaku-ha,” putting its anti-nuclear organization, “Nonukes Zenkoku Network (NAZEN),” at the forefront, mobilized its activists to a protest in front of the Prime Minister’s Office and rallies and demonstrations around the country, while independently conducting a signature-collecting campaign demanding an immediate shutdown and decommissioning of all reactors and protesting in front of power companies across Japan. In addition, the group opposed the government policy of disposing a part of the earthquake debris in local governments outside of the disaster areas. When debris was brought to Kitakyushu City, Fukuoka Prefecture, its activists together with opposing residents disrupted the progress by sitting in front of the trucks carrying the debris (May). Concerning the restart of Oi nuclear power plant, an activist of the group injured a security guard by pressing a burning flare against him near the nuclear plant’s gate (June).

Criticizing the nuclear policy of the government, the JCP demanded an immediate break away from nuclear power.

The JCP had its leaders and Diet members join rallies and demonstrations organized by, among others, anti-nuclear organizations, and criticized the government's nuclear policy. Chairman Shii attended the protest in front of the Prime Minister's Office and criticized the restart of the Oi nuclear power plant and the resumed construction of Oma nuclear power plant, saying, "The government ignores a large number of citizens demanding zero-nuclear." The party together with its affiliated "National Network to Eliminate Nuclear Power" held simultaneous nationwide rallies and demonstrations (March and November), and criticized the government.

In response to the mounting anti-nuclear movement and the results of a public comment survey conducted by the government in which 81% of the respondents demanded immediate abolition (August), the JCP changed its previous policy of "prompt withdrawal from nuclear power generation within 5 to 10 years" (June 2011), and announced a proposal to demand an "immediate break away from nuclear power" (September).

Column: A group calling for "withdrawal from nuclear power generation" illegally occupied the premises of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry.

Activists continued their presence in the tent set up in a corner of the premises of METI without approval in September 2011 and held protests against the restart of nuclear power generation. The tent was also used for sit-in protests and as a rendezvous point for the protests in front of the Prime Minister's Office. The activists stated, "We will not go away unless the government adopts the policy of breaking away from nuclear power generation" and continued the illegal occupation, ignoring the expulsion order by METI.

(2) Moves of domestic groups concerning US forces in Japan and the TPP.

- Radical leftist groups and the JCP waged campaigns against, among others, the deployment of the Osprey and the joining of TPP talks in various locations.

Campaigns were waged against the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan and Osprey deployment.

Concerning the realignment of US forces in Japan, as the talks between the government and Okinawa Prefecture over the relocation of the US Futenma Base in Okinawa broke down, radical leftist groups and the JCP deployed activities to protest against the construction of the facilities to replace the Futenma Base. The JCP supported candidates opposing the base in the Ginowan City mayoral election (February) and the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly election (June), and it also called for an “immediate closure and removal of the Futenma Base” and a “stop to the construction of a new base.”

Regarding the deployment of the MV22 Osprey, a new type of transport aircraft, to the US Futenma Base, radical leftist groups and the JCP argued that the “Osprey is a defective aircraft, with repeated crash accidents from its development stage” and conducted protests demanding a retraction of the deployment plan in various locations. Around US Iwakuni Base, Yamaguchi Prefecture, where the aircraft were temporarily held, they, together with local residents opposing the move, held rallies and a demonstration on the sea protesting the landing (July) and trial flight (September). They sent their activists/party members from all over the country to the anti-Osprey Rally in Okinawa (September), which was called by the prefectural assembly. On October 1, when Ospreys were deployed, together with local residents opposing the deployment, they staged a protest rally before the gates of the Futenma Base. Radical leftist groups, in particular, blocked a passage to the base by sitting in front of the gates.

They implemented campaigns against joining the TPP talks and a rise in the consumption tax.

As there were arguments for and against joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TTP) talks and a rise in the consumption tax (the bill was enacted in August) due to their significant impact on people’s living, radical leftist groups and the JCP conducted activities criticizing the government’s policies and responses.

The JCP argued that the TPP would destroy domestic agriculture and medical care and campaigned against joining TPP talks. Chairman Shii and other Diet members of the party attended rallies held by the Japan Agricultural Cooperatives (JA) and others against joining TPP talks and stated that they would work with a coalition against the TPP. The party’s affiliated farmers’ organizations held opposition rallies in various locations. The party also continually participated in the protest

activities by citizen groups in front of the Prime Minister's Office since August.

Meanwhile, among radical leftist groups, "Chukaku-ha" formed an affiliated farmers' organization against the TPP with the aim of attracting opposing farmers. ATTAC-Japan, led by the JRCL (formerly Fourth International group), together with those citizen groups opposing the joining of TPP talks, held rallies and study sessions to boost the opposition movement.

Concerning the rise in the consumption tax, the JCP announced a "proposal" advocating that improvement of social welfare was possible without dependence on the consumption tax (February), and held meetings inviting small and medium businesses in major cities to ask for their understanding, while implementing campaigns including the distribution of a digest version of the proposal on the streets across Japan. In addition, Diet members and other party members continually participated in the protest activities by citizen groups and others in front of the Prime Minister's Office since July.

Exploiting activities to support the area affected by the Great East Japan Earthquake to expand the organization.

In the disaster areas, radical leftists and other groups implemented recruitment and propaganda activities while engaging in support activities. Among them, "Chukaku-ha" promoted construction of a clinic (opened in December) in Fukushima City with the aim of building "a base for a revolutionary union." The "Kaiho-ha" group of the Revolutionary Workers' Association called for participation in volunteer activities for the disaster areas, while at the same time calling for participation in the group's activities.

A new religious organization that originated in South Korea and a self-development organization based in the US engaged in volunteer activities such as debris removal and mowing, while at the same time practicing treatments based on their unique teaching on earthquake victims. They strived to improve the image of their organizations by posting their activities in the disaster areas on their websites.

3. Radical Leftist Groups

- (1) Radical leftist groups worked to expand and strengthen their organization.
- “Chukaku-ha” tried to expand its organization through labor and anti-nuclear movements.
 - “Kakumaru-ha” intensified its approach to members of Japan Federation of National Service Employees and other unions.
 - The “Kaiho-ha” group of the Revolutionary Workers’ Association promoted efforts to organize day-laborers.

“Chukaku-ha” focused on attracting students as well as workers.

Following 2011, “Chukaku-ha” under its class-based labor movement policy to build the organization around labor movement, focused on penetration into unions of teachers, local governments, Japan Railways (JR), and Japan Post (JP), which the group calls “four key industries,” and on approaching contingent workers. Meanwhile the group worked to attract students through anti-nuclear rallies in Fukushima Prefecture and other disaster areas, and it established its student organization in the prefecture. The group held the annual National Workers’ Rally as the final result of its effort to expand the organization during the year in November (Tokyo), mobilizing approximately 2,200 people.

The group is anticipated to continue its focus on attracting workers and others.

“Kakumaru-ha” conducted propaganda, taking up issues including the review of public servants’ salaries.

Under the policy to attract members of unions with a focus on the Japan Federation of National Service Employees (JFNSE), “Kakumaru-ha” mobilized activists in the areas around the venues of the Central May Day event (April) and meeting halls where these unions held regular meetings. It took up the issue of the review of public servants’ salaries and retirement benefits, and criticized the leaderships of the unions, saying “Don’t allow union leaders to tolerate deep cuts in salary and retirement allowances,” and encouraged workers to join the group.

It is anticipated that the group will continue to work to expand its organization in the labor field with a focus on key industry labor unions, including the JFNSE as well as the Japan Confederation of Railway Workers’ Unions and the East Japan Railway Worker’s Union, in which a considerable number of its activists are in positions enabling exertion of influence.

The “Kaiho-ha” group of the Revolutionary Workers’ Association deployed activities to support day-laborers.

Both the mainstream and anti-mainstream factions of the “Kaiho-ha” group of the Revolutionary Workers’ Association worked to attract day-laborers and others through activities such as a soup

kitchen and an appeal for improvement of their working conditions. While being involved in the operation of a nursing care business for people with disabilities, the group emphasized the support of its activists in a trial for swindling the livelihood protection subsidy for people with disabilities.

Anti-globalization groups affiliated with radical leftist groups implemented protest activities against international conferences.

ATTAC-Japan, led by the JRCL (formerly Fourth International group), and others implemented rallies and demonstrations in the areas around the hall of the IMF-World Bank annual meeting (October, Tokyo), accusing the IMF and World Bank of increasing economic disparity and poverty.

Column: Changes in the activity style of radical leftist groups

In the past, the typical “fighting style” of radical leftist groups was strongly colored with the sect’s character, with activists wearing helmets and hiding their faces with masks or towels. In recent years, a less sectarian and ideological style under the guise of, among others, mass organizations is becoming mainstream, especially for “Chukaku-ha,” which is more focused on increasing its organizational strength. As a result, some young people casually participated in their softer demonstrations.

(2) Moves of the “Yodo-go” group and the Japanese Red Army.

- The “Yodo-go” group indicated an intention to file an action toward the retraction of the arrest warrants on the charge of abducting Japanese nationals.
- The Japanese Red Army maintained its dangerous nature in the 40th year after the Lod Airport Massacre in Tel Aviv.

The “Yodo-go” group attempted to make progress on their members’ return to Japan with a focus on “a state compensation suit.”

The “Yodo-go” group, including the Japan Airline “Yodo-go” hijackers (see note), who had been demanding the retraction of the arrest warrants on the charge of abducting Japanese nationals as a precondition for the members’ return to Japan, decided to file a state

Internationally wanted “Yodo-go” group members

Shiro Akagi	Suspicion of hijacking
Kimihiro Uomoto	Suspicion of hijacking and kidnapping
Takahiro Konishi	Suspicion of hijacking
Moriaki Wakabayashi	Suspicion of hijacking
Yoriko Mori	Suspicion of kidnapping, etc.
Sakiko Wakabayashi	Suspicion of kidnapping, etc.
Takeshi Okamoto	Suspicion of hijacking

*The Yodo-go group claims that Okamoto is dead.

compensation suit against the issuance of the arrest warrants (April) with the aim to gain public support for the group toward the retraction. The group appealed for support while poising to campaign toward their return with a focus on the suit.

It is anticipated that the “Yodo-go” group will prepare to file “a state compensation suit” toward the retraction of the arrest warrants on the charge of abducting Japanese nationals.

Note: On March 31, 1970, nine activists of the Red Army Faction of the Communist League hijacked Japan Airline Flight 351, whose nickname was “Yodo-go,” and surrendered themselves to the North Korean authority after landing near Pyongyang on April 3.

While maintaining its dangerous nature, the Japanese Red Army may seek a connection with the anti-nuclear movement.

The Japanese Red Army has attempted to justify the Lod Airport Massacre in Tel Aviv (May 30, 1972) committed by three of its members, including Kozo Okamoto, calling the incident the “Lydda Struggle” and positioning it as an important incident in the “Palestine Liberation Struggle.” Japanese Red Army members and supporters held gatherings to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the incident (May and June). As in previous years, Fusako Shigenobu, the top leader of the Japanese Red Army, who is serving time in prison (20 years), sent a statement to the gatherings, justifying the incident. There has been no change in the Japanese Red Army’s dangerous nature, as it continues to

Japanese Red Army members on the international wanted list

Kozo Okamoto
Junzo Okudaira
Norio Sasaki
Akira Nihei
Kunio Bando
Hisashi Matsuda
Ayako Daidoji

try to justify the incident, and also as seven of its members, who committed a heinous crime in the past, remain on the international wanted list.

As Shigenobu stated that “the Palestine Liberation Struggle” is “connected with the wish for Japan’s revolution with a focus on breaking away from nuclear power generation,” it is anticipated that while the Japanese Red Army is maintaining its dangerous nature, its members and supporters will seek a connection with the anti-nuclear movement and international solidarity.

4. The Japan Communist Party (JCP)

The JCP put efforts into various activities with an eye to Diet resolution and general elections.

- It focused on a “big campaign to expand the party’s power” to strengthen its ability.
- It attempted to impress its presence by taking a clearly adversarial stand against the DPJ, the LDP and the Japan Restoration Party.

The JCP focused on the “big campaign to expand the party’s power” marking the 90th anniversary of the party’s foundation, but grew at a sluggish rate.

Positioning 2012, which marks the 90th anniversary of the party’s foundation, as a “year of a new breakthrough” and focusing on the promotion of the “big campaign to expand the party’s power” (from July 2011 to July 2012), the party set a goal to gain 50,000 new party members, 50,000 new readers for *Shimbun Akahata* Daily and 170,000 new readers for its Sunday edition, and repeatedly called for the attainment of the goals through meetings of local party leaders and *Shimbun Akahata*. The result of the “big campaign to expand the party’s power,” however, was approximately 20,000 new members (approximately 320,000 members in total) during the period, while the circulation of *Shimbun Akahata* remained at the same level (approximately 1.3 million issues) as that when the campaign started.

Preparing for the general election from the beginning of the year to gain more seats.

Anticipating “an early dissolution over the issue of the rise in the consumption tax,” the expected JCP candidates and others conducted activities including propaganda on the street with a view to a snap Diet election since the beginning of the year.

In these activities, they argued that “the three DPJ administrations fell short of the people’s expectations of the regime change” and that “the LDP is in the same position in terms of the big rise in the consumption tax.” They also rejected the Japan Restoration Party as “seeking the politics of the LDP in partnership with existing politicians” and impressed the party’s difference from these parties by arguing that “the JCP is the only party that can realize drastic changes in important political issues.”

Concerning the Senkaku Islands, the party made a proposal to the Japanese government and the Chinese Embassy in Japan to work for a settlement through diplomatic negotiation (September), while at the same time trying to impress its distinctiveness by mentioning the proposal in its propaganda activities.

The JCP also put efforts into the approach to the conservatives and young generation. In its approach to the conservatives, the party visited agricultural and commercial organizations, stressed its opposition to Japan’s joining the TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership) talks and the rise in the

consumption tax, and called for a coalition. In its approach to the young generation, the party sought exchange with them by asking to answer questionnaire surveys concerning employment issues and participate in volunteer activities to help people afflicted by the Great East Japan Earthquake.

Against this backdrop, the JCP held the Central Committee's 5th Plenum in October and advocated a "big campaign to advance in the general election" till the dissolution of the House of Representatives. In the campaign, the party set the goals of gaining 30,000 new party members and restoring the circulation of *Shimbun Akahata* to the level seen at the time of the previous general election (approximately 1.5 million issues), while announcing that it "aims to win more than 6.5 million votes for the proportional-representation constituency and a twofold increase from the 9 current seats."

Later, the JCP claimed that the dissolution of the House of Representatives in November was "forced by public anger," fielded 299 candidates for single-seat districts and 35 candidates for proportional representation seats (23 of them did not double for single-seat districts) in the general election in December and appealed for support, stressing that "today, when the nature of political parties is called into question, only the Japan Communist Party has honored its words for almost a century without shifting."

The party is likely to continue its efforts to expand the party's power and build its ability, while making proposals in various policy issues in an effort to impress its presence.

5. Right-Wing Groups

Right-wing groups conducted various activities focusing on territorial/diplomatic issues.

- They conducted activities taking up issues with neighboring countries, such as China and South Korea.
- They criticized the government, and conducted anti-communism activities and activities against organized crime exclusion ordinances.

Right-wing groups conducted protest activities taking up moves of neighboring countries concerning Senkaku Islands, Takeshima, and the Northern Territories.

Right-wing groups conducted activities in response to China's stance toward moves including the Tokyo Governor's announcement of a scheme to purchase the Senkaku Islands (April) and the acquisition and retention of the islands by the Japanese government (September), as well as against the Japanese government's handling of the situation.

After the Tokyo Governor's announcement of a scheme to purchase the Senkaku Islands, right-wing groups staged street campaigns supporting the governor in the areas near the metropolitan government and sent encouragement letters to him.

Meanwhile, taking up the illegal landing on Uotsurijima by Chinese activists who claim Chinese sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands (August), the attack on an official car of the Japanese ambassador to Beijing (August), and anti-Japan demonstrations that took place in China after the acquisition and retention of the Senkaku Islands by the Japanese government (September), right-wing groups staged street campaigns urging the public "not to allow aggression by the hegemonic state China," while criticizing the "weak-kneed diplomacy" of the Japanese government. On the day which they term the "9.29 Anti-Communist-China Day" (the Japan-China Joint Communiqué was signed on that day in 1972), which has been held every year, they conducted street campaigns, rallies and demonstrations criticizing China mainly in the cities hosting Chinese diplomatic offices. Against this backdrop, members of right-wing groups committed the forcible obstruction of business by throwing a smoke bomb into the premises of a Chinese diplomatic office in Fukuoka (September) and the destruction of a structure by throwing a plastic bottle filled with India ink at a building (Osaka) in September.

Concerning the issue of Takeshima, they engaged in activities to demand the "recapture of Takeshima" on "Takeshima Day" (February 22), which was designated by Shimane Prefecture. In addition, in the areas near South Korean diplomatic offices in different locations in Japan, they protested against South Korean President Lee Myung Bak's landing on Takeshima (August) and his comment regarding the Emperor. Meanwhile, a member of a right-wing group destroyed a structure

by throwing a brick at a Korean diplomatic office in Hiroshima (August).

Those right-wing-affiliated groups claiming anti-foreign ideas and calling for participation in their activities through the Internet and other means pressed for the dismissal of a Korean actress who had claimed Takeshima to be Korean territory from a commercial for a Japanese company (March, Osaka). They staged demonstrations calling for the breakup of diplomatic relations with South Korea in Tokyo, Osaka, and other locations on and off since June.

Regarding the issue of the Northern Territories, taking the opportunity of Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov's visit to Japan in January, the Day of Northern Territories (February), and Prime Minister Medvedev's visits to Kunashiri Island (July), right-wing groups conducted protest activities in the areas near Russian diplomatic offices in Japan.

In addition to their criticism of the government and protest activities against the All Japan Teachers and Staff Union and Japan Teachers' Union, right-wing groups conducted activities opposing Organized Crime Exclusion Ordinances.

Criticizing the DPJ government as an "anti-Japan government breaking its promises," right-wing groups staged a street campaign calling for the defeat of the DPJ government in the areas surrounding the venue of the DPJ's 2012 regular convention in January (Tokyo). In response to the meetings of experts studying the possible creation of imperial female branches (6 times in total from February to July), some right-wing groups advocating maintenance of the status quo argued that "it could lead to a female Emperor/female-line Emperor in the future" and protested against government-affiliated agencies. Against the 61st educational research meeting of the Japan Teachers' Union in January (Toyama) and the 2012 educational research meeting of the All Japan Teachers and Staff Union (AJTSU) in August (Hyogo), they staged street campaigns calling on people to "smash the Japan Teachers' Union, which is implementing biased education," and to "break up the AJTSU, which caused the decay of education." In response to North Korea's launch of a missile purported to be a "satellite" in April, they conducted protest activities in the area surrounding Chongryon facilities, while some right-wing groups staged a street campaign criticizing the response of the government in the area surrounding the Prime Minister's Office.

Some right-wing groups having ties with organized crime groups argued that so-called Organized Crime Exclusion Ordinances (enforced in all prefectures in October 2011) "infringe human rights of specific persons" and conducted street campaigns in various locations since December 2011. In particular, some of the right-wing groups of western Japan who were leading the activities continually conducted street campaigns in various locations (January to October) and a demonstration in Aichi (October) together with other groups across Japan on an ongoing basis.

Column: Various moves concerning territories

- Attempts of some right-wing groups to land on the Senkaku Islands were exposed

After the “Chinese fishing boat collision incident” in the sea area near the Senkaku Islands (September 2010), the idea to land on the Senkaku Islands gained momentum among right-wing groups. Inspired by the report of the Tokyo metropolitan government’s scheme to purchase the islands in April and the subsequent hard-line stance of China against Japan, some groups tried to land on the islands by chartering a fishing boat at Ishigaki and other islands. However, the groups just navigated in the sea area surrounding the Senkaku Islands (September) and none of them actually landed on the Islands. Meanwhile, local assembly members (July and August), leaders of a conservative citizens group (August), and members of a new-religion-affiliated political group (September) landed on the Islands in succession.

- A right-wing-affiliated group and others set up stakes they call “Monument of Takeshima”

A right-wing-affiliated group and some right-wing groups set up stakes marked “Takeshima is an integral part of Japan” (wooden stakes about 4.5×4.5×100cm) in front of South Korean diplomatic offices in Japan and facilities of Korean Residents Union in Japan, among others, in various locations since March. They conducted similar activities in South Korea as well (June and August) and reported a series of activities through Internet video posting sites and blogs.

Appendix: Recent Major Security Developments

Major Security Developments in International Relations

Jan	6	Japan Coast Guard found three people on a drifting ship coming from North Korea off the coast of Oki, Shimane prefecture. They were taken into protective custody, sent to Dalian, China, and handed over to North Korea on January 9.
	14	A Chinese fisheries administration vessel navigated Japan's contiguous zone off Kubashima of the Senkaku Islands. Since then Chinese fisheries administration vessels frequently navigated the zone around the Senkaku Islands (Feb, Apr, May, Jun and Oct) and entered Japan's territorial waters (Jul, Sep and Nov).
		Taiwanese President Ma Yingjeou was re-elected in the presidential election.
Feb	16	Celebrating the 70th anniversary of General Secretary Kim Jong Il (Kwangmyongsong Day), North Korea held various commemorative events, including an unveiling ceremony for statues of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il (February 14), a central report meeting (February 15), and a rally of army-navy-air force officers and soldiers (February 16).
	19	Chongryon Chairman So Man Sul died. Chongryon held a memorial service (Chongryon funeral) in Korea Central Hall in Tokyo on February 25.
		A Chinese maritime surveillance boat demanded that a Japan Coast Guard's patrol ship conducting oceanographic surveys in Japan's exclusive economic zone off Kumeshima, Okinawa prefecture, stop the activities. Later Chinese maritime surveillance ships navigated in Japan's contiguous zone around the Senkaku Islands (August) and entered Japan's territorial waters (Mar, Sep, Oct and Nov).
	23	US-North Korea talked about nuclear and other issues of North Korea (to February 24, Beijing). They agreed on a temporary halt of nuclear testing and long-range missile launching by North Korea on one hand, and aid of nutritious food from the United States to North Korea on the other (announced on 29).
	29	The Ministry of National Defense of Taiwan confirmed that a Taiwanese military personnel working at a base with a radar system was arrested for providing confidential information to China.
Mar	3	Against Japan's announcement of the names of its unnamed islands including four isles around the Senkaku Islands (March 2), the Spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry stated "The Diaoyu Island and other related isles have been part of inherent Chinese territory since ancient times, and China has indisputable sovereignty over them." China's State Oceanic Administration announced the names of 71 isles around the Senkaku Islands including "Diaoyu."
	4	An armed group attacked a Yemeni military base in the suburb of Zinjibar, the capital city of Abyan province in southern Yemen, killed at least 185 people, took 73 people hostage and seized a large amount of weapons/military equipment. "Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)" claimed responsibility for the incident.
	11	In Toulouse in southwestern France and its suburbs, three French soldiers were shot dead (on March 11 and 15) and a teacher and three children of a Jewish school were shot dead on March 19.
Apr	10	In response to a Philippine ship's preventing of Chinese fishing boats from entering the sea area around the Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea, China dispatched its official ships, causing the situation to develop into a confrontation between Philippine and Chinese ships for several months.
	11	North Korea held the 4th representative conference of the Workers' Party of Korea (4.25 Culture Hall, Pyongyang). Kim Jong Il was given the title of "Eternal General Secretary of the Party" and Kim Jong Un was given the title of "First Secretary of the Party."
	13	North Korea launched a missile purported to be a "satellite." On the same day, North Korea announced that "it failed to reach orbit" and "we are now investigating the cause of the failure."
		North Korea held the 5th Session of the 12th Supreme People's Assembly (Mansudae Capitol, Pyongyang). Kim Jong Il was given the title of "Eternal Chairman of the National Defense Commission" while Kim Jong Un assumed "First Chairman of the National Defense Commission."
15	North Korea held a military parade on the 100th anniversary of Kim Il Sung's birthday (Kim Il Sung Square, Pyongyang) and disclosed a new type of missile and launch vehicle. First Secretary Kim Jong Un made his first public speech.	

Apr	15	Simultaneous terrorist attacks were made in four locations including the capital city of Kabul and Nangarhar province in the eastern part of Afghanistan (to April 16). In Kabur, foreign diplomatic offices were attacked and the Japanese Embassy also suffered damage, 47 people, including 36 attackers, were killed and more than 60 people were injured. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the incidents.
	16	UN Security Council adopted a chairman's statement condemning the launch of a missile purported to be "satellite" by North Korea on April 13.
May	14	Criticizing the holding of "the 4th General Assembly of World Uyghur Congress" (to May 17, in Tokyo) and the visit to the Yasukuni Shrine by its members (May 14), the Spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry said "The anti-China separatists of the 'World Uyghur Congress' have been colluding with Japanese right-wing forces, which fully exposed their political nature aiming at splitting their motherland and undermining China-Japan relations." In talks with South Korean President Lee Myung Bak, who visited Myanmar, President Thein Sein denied the country's nuclear cooperation with North Korea, admitted to arms trading with North Korea for more than 20 years in the past and announced that the country would comply with the UN Security Council resolution prohibiting arms trade with North Korea.
	19	Chongryon called an extended meeting of the 3rd session of the 22nd Central Committee at Korea Central Hall in Tokyo and elected chief vice-chairman Ho Jong Man to the third Chairman.
Jun	4	The expert panel of the UN Security Council's Iran Sanctions Committee submitted to the President of the Council an annual report compiling violations by Iran.
	11	The expert panel of the UN Security Council's North Korea Sanctions Committee submitted to the President of the Council an annual report compiling violations by North Korea.
	21	China's State Council approved the establishment of "Sansha City," exercising jurisdiction over Parcel Islands, Macclesfield Bank, and Spratly Islands.
	25	A group proclaiming themselves to be related to international hacker group "Anonymous" called for a cyber attack named "Operation Japan" in protest against the revised Copyright Act enacted in Japan.
	26	Patrol boats of Taiwanese Coast Guard Administration entered Japan's territorial waters off Taishojima of the Senkaku Islands. Taiwanese patrol boats navigated Japan's contiguous zone around the Senkaku Islands (Oct) and frequently entered Japan's territorial waters (Jul and Sep).
	27	Chongryon lost a suit for confirmation of possession to land and buildings of the Korea Central Hall (Chongryon headquarters, Tokyo) at the court of final appeal. Tokyo District Court decided to start the procedure of forced auction of the land and buildings on July 12.
Jul	3	Prime Minister of Russia Medvedev visited Kunashiri Island of the Northern Territories and inspected a fish processing factory, port facilities, a hospital, etc. Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps test-launched a medium-range ballistic missile Shahab-3 that could reach Israel and short-range missiles in its military exercise in a desert area of the country.
	17	North Korea's Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, the Central Military Commission, the National Defense Commission and the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly decided to give First Secretary Kim Jong Un a title of "Marshal of the Republic."
	18	A man detonated himself in a bus carrying Israeli tourists at Burgas Airport in the eastern part of Bulgaria. Six people, including five Israeli nationals and a Bulgarian driver, were killed and 32 people were injured.
	30	Wang Jiarui, director of the International Liaison Department, visited North Korea (to August 3) and met with First Secretary Kim Jong Un and Kim Yong Il, secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea.
	Aug	9
	10	President of South Korea Lee Myung Bak visited Takeshima. Minister of Foreign Affairs Koichiro Genba summoned Korean Ambassador Shin Kak Soo to the Ministry to protest against the visit and expressed regret in a telephone conversation with South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Kim Sung Hwan.
	15	Okinawa Prefecture Police and others arrested 14 activists of "Hong Kong Action Committee for Defending the Diaoyu Islands" who landed on Uotsurijima of the Senkaku Island (deported on August 17). Anti-Japan demonstrations took place all over China, including Beijing and Shanghai, from August 15 to 26.

Aug	16	North Korean soccer team visited Japan (to September 1) to take part in 2012 FIFA U-20 Women's World Cup (August 19 to September 8).
		An armed group attacked Kamra-Minhas air base in Attock District, Punjab, killing a soldier and partially damaging a military aircraft. "Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)" claimed responsibility for the incident.
	27	A Japanese public vehicle driving with Ambassador Uichiro Niwa to China was stopped in Beijing and a national flag on the car was taken away.
	28	Members of "Zenkoku Seishinkai" and others visited North Korea to visit graves of war displaced Japanese remains (to September 6; Japanese citizens who used to live in North Korea visited graves four times from August to December).
	29	Keiichi Ono, director of Japanese Foreign Ministry's Northeast Asia Division, met with Ryu Song Il, a North Korean Foreign Ministry official, to talk about outstanding issues between Japan and North Korea, including the issue of Japanese remains in North Korea (to August 31, Beijing, China).
Sep	9	In the capital city Jakarta of Indonesia, a man with homemade bombs around his waist turned himself in and confessed to a plan of simultaneous terrorist attacks. It was revealed that the attacks were planned by a group of about 10 members calling themselves "al-Qaeda in Indonesia."
	10	The Japanese government decided to acquire and retain the Senkaku Islands. The Chinese foreign ministry strongly criticized the decision while major Chinese media ran comments criticizing Japan.
	11	Anti-Japan demonstrations took place all over China on consecutive days (to September 13) and massive demonstrations took place all over the country on September 15, 16 and 18 as well.
		An armed group attacked the US consulate in Benghazi of eastern Libya, killing the US ambassador and others.
	16	A group calling themselves members of a Chinese hacker group, "Honker Union," called for cyber attacks against Japanese government agencies in coordination with protest activities in China against the Japanese government's acquisition and retention of the Senkaku Islands.
	25	North Korea held the 6th Session of the 12th Supreme People's Assembly (People's Palace of Culture, Pyongyang) and adopted a law to extend the compulsory education from 11 years to 12 years.
Oct	10	The Canadian prosecutors office announced that a Canadian military personnel who was suspected to have provided confidential information to Russia admitted the charge of violating the Security of Information Act and other laws.
	19	The Chinese navy together with the State Oceanic Administration and the Fishing Bureau of the Ministry of Agriculture conducted a joint naval maneuver involving eleven ships. Seven Chinese ships, including missile destroyers, navigated Japan's contiguous zone off Nakanokamishima, Okinawa prefecture (October 16).
	20	Chongryon held its "2012 Chongryon congress for branch activists" (to October 21 at Korea University, Tokyo) and encouraged efforts for "patriotic model movement," a new mass movement to strengthen its organization.
Nov	4	North Korea held an extended meeting of the Political Bureau of the Workers' Party Central Committee (Pyongyang), adopted the establishment of the State Physical Culture and Sports Guidance Commission and chose Chang Song Taek, Vice Chairman of North Korea's National Defense Commission, as its Chairman.
	7	Voting and counting of the US presidential election were carried out on November 6. Democratic incumbent President Obama was reelected, beating the Republican candidate, former Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney.
	8	CPC held the 18th Party Congress (to November 14). Then on November 15, the First Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee chose seven Politburo Standing Committee members, including General Secretary Xi Jinping.
	13	Against a Japanese multiparty group's holding a lecture meeting inviting the 14th Dalai Lama, the spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry stated it "constitutes an infringement upon China's internal affairs. China strongly condemns this."
	15	Japan-North Korea intergovernmental consultations were held (to November 16, Ulan Bator, Mongolia). Shinsuke Sugiyama, director general of the Asian and Oceanic Affairs Bureau of Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Song Il Ho, North Korean ambassador in charge of DPRK-Japan talks, talked about the issue of Japanese nationals' abduction and Japanese remains left in North Korea.

Major Security Developments in Domestic Relations

Jan	1	The mainstream group of Aum Shinrikyo held its year-end and new-year intensive seminars (December 22, 2011, to January 3; Saitama, etc.).
		The Joyu group of Aum Shinrikyo held its year-end and new-year intensive seminars (December 23, 2011, to January 3; Tokyo, Osaka, etc.).
		Tokyo Metropolitan Police arrested Makoto Hirata, a suspect on the Aum Shinrikyo special wanted list (he turned himself in on December 31, 2011.)
	16	Right-wing groups staged a street campaign in the areas surrounding the venue of the DPJ's 2012 regular convention (Tokyo).
	23	Public Security Examination Commission decided to extend the period of surveillance on Aum Shinrikyo for the 4th time.
	28	Right-wing groups staged a street campaign calling for the "return of the Northern Territories" upon Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov's visit to Japan (Tokyo).
Feb	7	Right-wing groups conducted street campaigns calling for the "return of the Northern Territories" etc. on the Northern Territories Day (in various locations across the country).
Mar	11	Radical leftist groups and the JCP mobilized their activists and party members to rallies and demonstrations conducted at the first anniversary of the nuclear accident (in various locations in the country).
Apr	13	In response to North Korea's missile launch, right-wing groups conducted protest activities in areas surrounding Chongryon facilities (in various locations across the country).
	25	Radical leftist groups and the JCP mobilized their activists and party members to a "Rally against joining TPP talks" (Tokyo).
	27	The mainstream group of Aum Shinrikyo held golden-week intensive seminars (until May 6, in Saitama, etc.).
	28	The Joyu group of Aum Shinrikyo held golden-week intensive seminars (until May 6, in Tokyo, Osaka, etc.).
	29	Right-wing groups conducted street campaigns on Showa Day (in various locations across the country).
May	3	Right-wing groups conduct street campaigns on Constitution Memorial Day (in various locations across the country).
Jun	3	Tokyo Metropolitan Police arrested Naoko Kikuchi, a suspect on the Aum Shinrikyo special wanted list.
	15	Tokyo Metropolitan Police arrested Katsuya Takahashi, a suspect on the Aum Shinrikyo special wanted list.
	16	The government decided to restart the Oi nuclear power plant.
	23	The JCP-affiliated groups conducted a rally/demonstration against the rise in the consumption tax, etc. (Tokyo).
	29	Radical leftist groups and the JCP mobilized their activists and party members to protests against the restart of the Oi nuclear power plant in front of the Prime Minister's Office (approximately 20,000 participants, Tokyo).
Jul	1	Restart of the Oi nuclear power plant.
	4	Kanagawa Prefectural Police sent papers to prosecutors concerning the case against a semi-conductor production equipment sales company and its director on the charge of exporting to China semiconductor production equipment, the exporting of which requires permission from the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, without permission.
	16	Radical leftist groups and the JCP mobilized their activists and party members to a "national rally" calling for "breaking away from nuclear power generation" (Tokyo).
	18	The JCP held a lecture meeting commemorating the 90th anniversary of the party's foundation (Tokyo).
	20	The Ministry of Finance announced that multiple personal computers used by its personnel had been infected by malware with a possible data leak to outside.

Jul	26	The mainstream group of Aum Shinrikyo made an application with the Public Security Examination Commission to request execution of its authority to rescind surveillance.
	29	Radical leftist groups and the JCP mobilized their activists and party members to join the action surrounding the Diet with a “human chain” calling for “breaking away from nuclear power generation” (Tokyo).
Aug	4	The Joyu group of Aum Shinrikyo held summer intensive seminars (to August 26, in Tokyo, Osaka, etc.).
	9	Calling the day “Anti-Russia Day” right-wing groups conducted street campaigns, etc. calling for the “return of the Northern Territories” (in various locations around the country).
	10	The Diet passed a bill related to the Comprehensive Reform of Social Security and Tax including the rise in the consumption tax.
	11	Hiroshima Prefectural Police arrested a member of a right-wing group on a charge of destroying a structure in the South Korean Consulate General in Hiroshima.
	15	Right-wing groups visited Yasukuni Shrine and Gokoku Shrine and attended memorial services for the war dead (in various locations in the country).
	19	10 people, including metropolitan assembly members, landed on Uotsurijima of the Senkaku Islands.
Sep	9	Radical leftist groups sent their activists to a rally in Okinawa against the deployment of MV22 Ospreys to the US Futenma Base (Okinawa).
	11	The government nationalized three Senkaku Islands, including Uotsurijima Island.
	14	The mainstream group of Aum Shinrikyo holds autumn intensive seminars (until September 23, in Saitama, etc.).
	17	Fukuoka Prefectural Police arrested members of right-wing groups on a charge of forcible obstruction of business against the Chinese Consulate General in Fukuoka.
	19	The National Police Agency announced that cyber attacks which are believed to be related to the issues of the Senkaku Islands, etc. made at least 19 domestic websites difficult to view or altered them, including those of the Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications and the Supreme Court.
	25	The JCP announced a proposal to demand an “immediate break away from nuclear power.”
	29	Osaka Prefectural Police arrested members of right-wing groups on a charge of destruction of structure against Chinese Consulate General in Osaka (the charge was later changed to violation of the Minor Offense Law).
		Calling the day “9.29 Anti-Communist China Day,” right-wing groups conducted street campaigns and demonstrations calling for “protecting the Senkaku Islands at all costs” (in various locations in the country).
Oct	7	Right-wing groups conducted a demonstration against the Organized Crime Exclusion Ordinances (Aichi).
	12	Anti-globalization groups affiliated with radical leftist groups implemented protest activities in the areas around the venue of the IMF-World Bank annual meeting which was held from October 9 to 14, Tokyo.
	14	The JCP held the Central Committee’s 5th Plenum (to October 15, Tokyo).
	28	Calling the day “The Day for the Recapture of Takeshima,” right-wing groups conducted protest activities in areas surrounding South Korean diplomatic offices in Japan (in various locations in the country).
	30	The Public Security Examination Commission notified that it rejected the request by the mainstream group of Aum Shinrikyo to execute authority to rescind surveillance.
Nov	1	The Public Security Intelligence Agency implemented on-site inspections of a total of 29 Aum Shinrikyo facilities in 15 prefectures.
	4	The “Chukaku-ha” held the annual National Workers’ Rally (Tokyo).
	11	Radical leftist groups and the JCP mobilized their activists and party members to a protest calling for “breaking away from nuclear power generation” in the area near the Diet (Tokyo).
		The JCP and its affiliate groups implemented simultaneous nationwide activities calling for an “immediate break away from nuclear power” (in various locations in the country).